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In an effort to get parents more involved in their child’s schooling, 14 states have implemented
a policy and a further four states have pending bills that would allow parents time off from their
place of work to participate in their child’s schooling. In the first chapter, I examine the effect
of these school-related leave policies on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes, and identify some
potential mechanisms through which these policies can operate. I find evidence that the policy
affects math skills, whereby an additional hour off of work leads to a 0.005 standard deviation
increase in math skills. I identify increases in the probability of volunteering, attending a back
school night, and maternal employment and home inputs as potential mechanisms for this effect.
Despite recent state and federal initiatives emphasizing parental involvement in schools as a
way to improve child outcomes, there is little empirical evidence of the effects of parental in-
volvement, largely due to the empirical challenges involved in establishing causality. In the second
chapter, I study the effects of parental involvement on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes as stu-
dents progress through school. I address key challenges in the literature such as the non-random
nature of parental involvement and the exclusion of related input decisions such as home inputs,
employment, and fertility decisions that have the potential to affect and be affected by parental
involvement with ambiguous effects on child skill development. After addressing these sources
of bias, I find positive effects of volunteering in school on math, reading, and non-cognitive skills
comparable to 19%, 17%, and 64% of the direct effect of a mother having a bachelor’s degree or
higher, respectively. I find evidence of positive spillovers of parental involvement to other inputs,
most notably home inputs, that have positive effects on child skill formation. Using the estimated
model, I simulate the effect of existing state-level policies that allow parents time off from their
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place of work to participate in their child’s schooling. I find that allowing parents the maximum of
40 hours off per year to participate in their child’s school leads to increases in non-cognitive skills
over the life-cycle of the child, primarily through increasing the level of volunteering.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECT OF STATE SCHOOL-RELATED LEAVE POLICIES ON STUDENT
OUTCOMES
1.1 Introduction
Recent federal acts such as the current 2015 Every Student Succeeds Act and the preceding
2001 No Child Left Behind Act emphasize interactions between parents and teachers as a means
to improving student outcomes. Given the national priority of fostering greater contact between
parents and teachers, states themselves have taken the initiative to find innovative ways to get par-
ents involved in their child’s schooling. One such way in which states have sought to facilitate
greater contact between parents and teachers is through the implementation of employment-based
policies that allow parents time off from their place of work to participate in their child’s schooling,
geared at alleviating potentially binding work constraints. At the time of writing, 14 states had the
policy in place and a further 4 states had pending bills to implement the policy. The impacts of
the policy are potentially far-reaching. In 2017, 33.6 million families, or approximately 45% of
all families had children under 18 and of these families, 90.7% had at least one employed parent,
indicating that the vast majority of parents with school-aged children were employed. Despite the
relatively widespread implementation of the policy and the potential wide reaching impacts, as yet,
the effects of the policy have not yet been formally quantified. Using a large nationally represen-
tative survey, this paper evaluates the total effects of these state school-related leave policies on
the cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes of elementary school students and examines some of the
mechanisms through which the policies can affects outcomes.
I examine the total effect of the policy by regressing measures of cognitive and non-cognitive
outcomes on the state school-related leave policies and a vector of individual, household and state
characteristics, and grade (time) fixed effects to control for the effect of potentially confounding
variables. I provide some evidence to show that the policy is not reflecting the effect of other related
state characteristics by controlling for a rich set of state-level characteristics directly in the model.
Another concern with estimating the effect of the policy is the potential for states that have policy
to differ systematically in some unobserved way that causes these states to also have children with
higher or lower test scores, leading to inconsistent estimates of the effect of the policy. In lieu of
state fixed effects, I provide statistical evidence that this source of endogeneity is unlikely to be a
concern by evaluating average math and reading test scores in states that do and do not have the
policy in the pre-policy period and using a statistical test of the equality of means to determine that
these states do not have statistically different average test scores.
I find evidence of a positive total effect of the policy on math skills where a 1 hour increase
in the time parents are allowed off of work leads to a 0.005 standard deviation increase in math
skills. Interestingly, I find weak evidence of a negative effect of the policy on non-cognitive skills
where a 1 standard deviation increase in the policy leads to a decrease of 0.002 standard deviations
in non-cognitive skills, though only at the 10% level. I find some evidence of heterogeneity in the
effect of the policy on math skills, most notably lesser effects for Hispanic individuals for math
skills, and negative effects for individuals who do not speak English as the primary language at
home for reading and non-cognitive skills. Despite finding negative effects for individuals who do
not speak English as the primary language at home, I do not find evidence that the negative effects
are coming through the mechanisms explored in this paper. I also find evidence that the policy
matters more for individuals in later grades, and find some evidence to suggest that this is due to
the propensity for mothers to be more likely to be employed in these later grades. Interestingly,
whereas I do not find effects of reading scores in the baseline model, when I analyse differential
effects of the policy by grade, I find a positive effect of the policy on reading scores in grade 2.
I also examine some mechanisms through which the policy could be affecting outcomes based
on what has previously been discussed in the literature. Given that the policy is targeted at in-
creasing parental participation in school-based activities, I examine the effect of the policy along
various dimensions of parental involvement: the probability of volunteering, attending a parent-
teacher conference, attending a back to school night, attending a school event, and attending a
parent-teacher organization or association meeting. I find that the policy positively affects the
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probability of volunteering, attending a parent-teacher conference, and attending a back to school
night. Conversely, I find that the policy has a negative effect on the probability of attending a
PTA/PTO meeting. Given the theoretical evidence that parental involvement can affect the quan-
tity and quality of home inputs (Wherry (2004)), and the potential for maternal employment to be
affected by the policy through making work more attractive, or other indirect channels, I also ex-
amine whether the policy affects home inputs and maternal employment. I find positive effects of
the policy on both maternal employment and home inputs whereby a 1 hour increase in the number
of hours of school-related leave leads to a 0.006 per cent increase in the probability of maternal
employment and a 0.005 standard deviation increase in the level of home inputs. I also explore
heterogeneity in the effects of the policy on the above mechanisms but do not find much evidence
of heterogeneous effects.
My main contribution to the existing literature is providing the first evaluation of the effects of
these existing state school-related leave policies and examining some of the mechanisms through
which these policies can affect outcomes. To the best of my knowledge, I am aware of one other
paper that adopts a somewhat similar approach. Avvisati (2013) exploit a randomized experiment
in French middle schools that randomized parents of sixth graders into meetings at school with
the school head to discuss strategies on how best to support and monitor children with their school
work. The authors found that the intervention increased parent’s participation in both school-based
and home-based activities which translated into improvements in behaviour such as a reduction in
truancy and disciplinary sanctions, but did not find evidence of an improvement in test scores. My
research differs from the previous study along three dimensions: First, unlike the previous inter-
vention which only considered the effects of interactions between parents and the school head, the
policy has the potential to affect more general forms of parental involvement including interactions
between parents and teachers. One might expect that these two types of interactions may have dif-
ferent effects as teachers may be better able to give individualized advice tailored to each student
whereas the school head is likely to be able to only give general advice. This difference in the level
of interaction could explain why Avvisati (2013) found no evidence of an effect of the policy on
test scores. Second, in contrast to the previous study that was conducted in middle school, I focus
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on elementary school students. Previous research has shown that parental involvement matters
more earlier on in a child’s life, hence we might expect different effects in elementary and middle
school. Last, I evaluate the effect of an employment-based policy which may have different mech-
anisms than the randomized experiment. For instance, we might expect both interventions to affect
the level of parental involvement and possibly home inputs, but there might be additional effects
of the employment-based policy such as inducing women to work by making work more attractive
that may have additional effects on child skill formation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows, Section 1.2 discusses the data to be used in the
estimation and why it is well-suited for this analysis. Section 1.3 gives the empirical specification,
discussing estimation and identification. Section 1.4 gives results and Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Data
The dataset used for this analysis is the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten
Class (ECLS-K), a nationally representative sample of kindergarteners in the United States who
began kindergarten in the fall of 2010. The ECLS-K is a longitudinal survey of children, including
detailed information on their parents, schools and teachers. The survey collects information on
home and school inputs, in addition to cognitive and non-cognitive measures for children, making
the dataset well-suited to this analysis. The restricted use ECLS-K dataset contains information
on the state of residence of the child, allowing the dataset to be merged with state employment
legislation that dictates the number of hours of school-related leave a parent is allowed off. There
are currently four main waves of data: the fall (2010) and spring (2011) of kindergarten, the spring
of grade 1 (2012),1 the spring of grade 2 (2013), and the spring of grade 3 (2014) with the spring
of grades 4 (2015) and 5 (2016) forthcoming. For the purposes of this analysis, I use the spring of
grade 1, the spring of grade 2 and the spring of grade 3 waves.
I define my measures of parental involvement using 5 binary variables: the probability of
volunteering, attending a parent-teacher conference, attending a back to school night, attending a
school event, and attending a Parent-Teacher Organization (PTO) or Parent-Teacher Association
1A small sub-sample of the children were surveyed in the fall of grade 1 and the fall of grade 2.
4
(PTA) meeting. Summary statistics for the variables are presented in Appendix table A.1.3.
I define home inputs as activities parents partake in with their children outside the realm of the
school.2 The construct of home inputs is the simple average of four variables: the frequency the
child reads books, whether the child participates in extra-curricular activities, whether the number
of hours of TV watched on a weekday is above or below the sample median, and how often the
family eats dinner together.3 The average of the standardized home input index and summary
statistics of the variables used to construct the index are presented in Appendix table A.1.3.
Non-cognitive skills are extracted as a latent factor from the following teacher-reported mea-
sures: Approaches to learning, Self-control, Inter-personal skills, Externalizing and Internalizing
problem behaviours, Inhibitory Control and Attentional Focus. I aggregate these measures into a
single index using polychoric analysis for convenience and to reduce the number of parameters to
be estimated. I outline the procedure used to aggregate the non-cognitive scores in section A.2.1
of the appendix. The factor loadings associated with these variables are shown in Appendix Table
F.2.5. Approaches to Learning and Self-control are the variables that load most highly onto the
non-cognitive factor across all four waves.
Cognitive skills are measured by Item Response Theory (IRT) math and reading scores based
on standardized cognitive tests collected as part of the ECLS-K survey. I discuss the advantages of
using IRT test scores in section A.2.1 of the appendix.
I present the summary statistics for the variables used in this analysis in Appendix tables A.1.1-
A.1.4, and present the states with the number of hours in appendix table A.1.2 and the distribution
2One concern is that parental inputs at home and parental involvement at school may be both proxying for under-
lying latent parenting quality, however, I provide theoretical and empirical evidence that suggests the two are distinct
constructs. Firstly, parental involvement at school is an established concept in the education literature, and is treated
as a distinct concept from home inputs. Secondly, the theoretical existence of these as two separate dimensions of
parental inputs is validated statistically as suggested by the presence of two distinct factors when all variables are put
together, one that loads more on variables used in the construction of home inputs and one that loads more on variables
used in the parental involvement measure. Lastly, the correlation between volunteering at school and home inputs is
0.13, 0.15, 0.14, and 0.16 across the four waves, and the correlation between attending a parent-teacher conference
and home inputs are 0.04, 0.07, 0.06, and 0.06, a relatively lower degree of correlation than one would expect if the
two measures were capturing the same underlying dimension of parenting skill.
3I constrained my construct to variables that were available across all four waves for consistency in interpretation
of the construct.
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of the hours of school-related leave in figure A.1.7.
1.3 Empirical Framework
The primary interest of this study is quantifying the total effect of existing state-level school-
related leave policies on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes. Of additional interest is the effect
of the policy on potential mechanisms. I begin my analysis by specifying production functions for























where i indexes individual, f indexes states, and t indexes year. The variables Acift and A
n
ift
are the cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes of interest. The variable Pift represents the hours
of school-related leave per state. The primary parameters of interest are γc1 and γ
n
1 , which give
the direct effect of the policy on cognitive and non-cognitive skills, respectively. The vector
Xift captures exogenous characteristics and includes household income, the mother’s age and
age squared, family structure, the primary language spoken at home, the child’s gender and race,
and the mother’s education status. The vector Wift captures state-level characteristics such as the
expenditure per pupil, state GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average weekly welfare
benefit, and the average child tax credit. The term δt captures time/grade fixed effects and ψift is
an idiosyncratic error term.4
I maintain the same specifications to identify the effect of the policy on various mechanisms of
4Since this is a cohort study and I do not consider individuals who are retained, time fixed effects will be the same
as grade fixed effects.
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interest (Mift):
Mift = α1Pift + α2Xift + α3Wift + δt + ζift (1.3)
where the primary parameter of interest here is α1.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level in all specifications to account for correlation
in the error term across students in the same school.
1.3.1 Identification
As mentioned before, the primary parameters of interest are γc1 and γ
n
1 , which give the total ef-
fect of the policy on cognitive and non-cognitive skills, respectively. One concern with estimating
these parameters is that the state school-related leave policies could be correlated with other related
state-level characteristics that can affect outcomes. For instance, one possibility is that states with
more generous school-related leave policies are states that spend more on education. If spending
more on education affects student outcomes, then the effect of the policy would be conflated with
the effect of increased educational spending. I argue that controlling for a rich set of state char-
acteristics, including education expenditure per pupil, in the term Wift addresses this and other
related concerns. A more challenging concern is that policy generosity might be correlated with
unobserved state characteristics that are in turn correlated with child outcomes. For instance, states
with more generous policies could be states that systematically have students that perform better
or worse due to some unobserved state-level characteristics. Since the variation in the policy over
time within the sample is not sufficient to accommodate state fixed effects, in order to give some
indication as to whether this source of bias is likely to be of concern, I evaluate the differences in
math and reading test scores in states that do and do not have the policy in the pre-policy period
using data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress math and reading test scores and
perform a t-test on the differences of means.5 I discuss this test further in Appendix section B.1.1
and report the results in table 1.1, below. Based on the test statistics of the differences in means, the
5The data is provided by the National Center for Education Statistics.
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probability that the difference is not equal to zero is rejected at conventional significance levels and
the probability that math and reading scores are lower in states that have the policy is not rejected
at the 10% level. The results indicate that if this form of bias is present, that the estimates would
be biased downwards as states that have the policy tended to have individuals with lower math and
reading test scores compared with individuals in states without the policy. Theoretically, the policy
should be tested the policy along the intensive margin, however, data limitations precludes this.
Analogous arguments can be made for recovering consistent estimates of the parameter α1.
Table 1.1: Test of Equivalence of Means for Math and Reading Test Scores for States With and
Without the Policy in the Pre-policy Period
No Policy Policy Pr(diff < 0) Pr(diff 6= 0) Pr(diff > 0)
Math 219.70 215.08 0.93 0.15 0.05
(7.67) (9.35)
Reading 216.73 211.83 0.92 0.15 0.08
(7.19) (10.30)
1.4 Results
In table 1.2, I present the effects of the policies on the pooled sample of math, reading and
non-cognitive skills. I find that allowing parents an additional hour off of work leads to a 0.005
standard deviation increase in a child’s math skills. By contrast, I do not find direct effects of
the policy on a child’s reading skills and find weak evidence of a negative effect on the policy on
non-cognitive skills of the magnitude of 0.002 standard deviations at the 10% significance level.
Since the index of non-cognitive skills could be masking differential effects of the policy by
the individual components in the index, in table 1.3, I replace the index of non-cognitive skills with
the individual skills comprising the index (See table F.2.5) and repeat the analysis. Column 1 re-
ports approaches to learning, Column 2 reports self-control, Column 3 reports interpersonal skills,
Column 4 reports externalizing behaviour, Column 5 reports internalizing behaviour, Column 6
reports attentional focus, and Column 7 reports inhibitory control. Based on the analysis, it ap-
pears there is variation in the effect of the policy across different measures of non-cognitive skills,
though none reflect a positive effect. Specifically, the policy has a negative impact on approaches
to learning, self-control and externalizing behaviour, the skill most associated with behavioural
8




Policy 0.0046∗∗∗ (0.0015) −0.0007 (0.0015) −0.0019∗ (0.0011)
Observations 21750 21750 21750
R2 0.48 0.41 0.13
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use
dataset. Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls
have been suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s
age squared, mother’s education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure,
primary language spoken at home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment
rate, the average weekly welfare benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the
average unemployment insurance claims, and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the
10% level, ** refers to statistical significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the
1% level.
problems, which are all statistically significant at the 5% level. I find weak evidence of a negative
effect of the policy on interpersonal skills and internalizing behaviours, and no effect of the policy
on attentional focus and inhibitory control. Previous findings in the literature have documented a
potential negative effect of parental involvement on non-cognitive skills through mechanisms such
as reducing children’s excitement about learning and psychological health, and increasing their
stress levels (Kohn (2013)), that could be reflected in the negative effect observed here.
Table 1.3: Reduced Form Effect of the State School-Related Leave Policy on Different Compo-
nents of Non-Cognitive Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
App. Cont. Per. Ext. Int. Att. Inh.
Policy −0.0028∗∗∗−0.0023∗∗ −0.0022∗ −0.0026∗∗ −0.0018∗ −0.0006 −0.0008
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Observations 21750 21750 21750 21750 21750 21750 21750
R2 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.11
Notes: Column (1) reports approaches to learning, Column (2) reports self-control, Column (3) reports interpersonal
skills, Column (4) reports externalizing behaviour, Column (5) reports internalizing behaviour, Column (6) reports
attentional focus, and Column (7) reports inhibitory control. Observations have been rounded to comply with the
requirements of using the restricted-use dataset. Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parenthe-
ses. The full set of controls have been suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age,
mother’s age squared, mother’s education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, pri-
mary language spoken at home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average
weekly welfare benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the average unemployment insurance
claims, and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical significance at the
5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Since it is possible that the policy could have positive effects that diminish as the number of
hours allowed off increases, in table 1.4 I check for potential non-linearities in the effect of the
policy by including the number of hours squared. I do not find any evidence to suggest that there
are non-linear effects of the policy. I also experimented with a cubic specification (not shown)
where I included the number of hours cubed, and did not find any evidence of non-linearities in
that specification.




Policy 0.0052 (0.0054) 0.0018 (0.0042) 0.0018 (0.0032)
Policy squared −0.0000 (0.0001) −0.0001 (0.0001) −0.0001 (0.0001)
Observations 21750 21750 21750
R2 0.48 0.41 0.13
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use
dataset. Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of con-
trols have been suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s
age squared, mother’s education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, pri-
mary language spoken at home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate,
the average weekly welfare benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the average
unemployment insurance claims, and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level,
** refers to statistical significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
Pooling the sample could be masking important heterogeneity by grade (time). Such hetero-
geneity may be of interest to policy makers as it may reveal information about the effectiveness
and/or uptake of the policy in different grades. In table 1.6, I check whether the policy has dif-
ferential effects depending on the grade of the child by interacting the policy with grade fixed
effects. I find that the policy has positive effects on math skills in grade 2 and grade 3, relative
to grade 1. Interestingly, whereas I do not find an effect on reading skills in the baseline model,
I find that the policy has positive effects on reading skills in grade 2, relative to grade 1. I do
not find heterogeneous effects in non-cognitive skills by grade level. One hypothesis for why the
effects of the policy are largely confined to later grades is that parents may be more likely to be
employed in the child’s later grades, hence the policy may have a greater effect on alleviating work
constraints in these later grades. In order to test this hypothesis, I evaluate the determinants of
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maternal employment in table 1.6 including grade (time) fixed effects. As can be seen from the
table, the mother is more likely to be employed, and thus potentially more time constrained, in
grades 2 and 3, compared with grade 1, providing some support for this hypothesis.
Table 1.5: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy on Outcomes by Grade (Time)
(1) (2) (3)
Math Reading Non-Cognitive
Policy 0.0021 (0.0017) −0.0019 (0.0014) −0.0023∗∗ (0.0011)
Policy*Grade 2 0.0051∗∗∗ (0.0012) 0.0023∗∗ (0.0011) 0.0013 (0.0011)
Policy*Grade 3 0.0028∗∗ (0.0014) 0.0010 (0.0012) 0.0017 (0.0013)
Grade 2 1.2755∗∗∗ (0.0230) 1.1142∗∗∗ (0.0161) −0.0118 (0.0177)
Grade 3 2.1290∗∗∗ (0.0553) 1.8114∗∗∗ (0.0211) −0.0051 (0.0203)
Observations 21750 21750 21750
R2 0.48 0.41 0.13
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls have been
suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared,
mother’s education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language
spoken at home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average
weekly welfare benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the average unemployment
insurance claims, and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to
statistical significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
1.4.1 Heterogeneous Policy Effects
Prior to considering possible heterogeneous effects of the policy by different groups of indi-
viduals, it is first interesting to see which types of individuals could potentially disproportionately
benefit from the policy based on their propensity for employment. In table 1.6, I regress maternal
employment on a vector of exogenous characteristics to identify the most salient characteristics
for employment. Older mothers, more educated mothers, wealthier mothers, and black mothers
(compared with white mothers) are more likely to be employed. By contrast, mothers who do not
speak English as the primary language at home, Hispanic mothers (compared with white mothers),
and single parents are less likely to be employed. Guided by the key determinants of maternal em-
ployment, I examine whether there are heterogeneous effects of the policy by maternal education
status, race, primary language spoken at home, income, which I demean in the interaction term for
ease of interpretation, and family structure in tables 1.7-1.11 respectively.
In table 1.7, I find that the policy has negative effects on non-cognitive skills for mothers with
11




Mother’s Age 0.8748∗∗∗ (0.1901)
Mother’s Age Sq. −0.1145∗∗∗ (0.0259)
Some College 0.4351∗∗∗ (0.0551)
Bachelors or Higher 0.7685∗∗∗ (0.0642)




Single Parent −0.5917∗∗∗ (0.0631)
Non-English Home Language −0.3584∗∗∗ (0.0695)
Grade 2 0.1540∗∗∗ (0.0248)
Grade 3 0.2665∗∗∗ (0.0323)
Constant −1.3988∗∗∗ (0.3552)
Observations 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the require-
ments of using the restricted-use dataset. Standard errors clustered at
the school level are reported in parentheses. * refers to statistical sig-
nificance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical significance at the
5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
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some college or a bachelors or higher education relative to high school or less than high school,
potentially due to the reasons discussed previously. By contrast, with the exception of a weakly
positive effect of the policy for mothers with some college education relative to high school or less
than high school, I do not find evidence of policy heterogeneity for math and reading test scores.
Table 1.7: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy on Outcomes by Education Status
(1) (2) (3)
Math Reading Non-Cognitive
Policy 0.0029 (0.0020) −0.0008 (0.0021) 0.0006 (0.0013)
Policy*College 0.0043∗ (0.0022) 0.0014 (0.0024) −0.0035∗∗ (0.0016)
Policy*Bachelors 0.0014 (0.0025) −0.0005 (0.0025) −0.0041∗∗ (0.0017)
Some College 0.2537∗∗∗ (0.0400) 0.2946∗∗∗ (0.0374) 0.0841∗∗∗ (0.0268)
Bachelors or Higher 0.6165∗∗∗ (0.0425) 0.6543∗∗∗ (0.0393) 0.2583∗∗∗ (0.0295)
Observations 21750 21750 21750
R2 0.48 0.41 0.13
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls have been
suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s
education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at
home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average weekly welfare
benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the average unemployment insurance claims,
and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical significance at the
5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
In table 1.8, I show that the effect of the policy is less effective for math skills for Hispanic
children but do not find differential effects by race for black children or children from other races.
A lesser effect of the policy by race could be explained by racial differences in the propensity to
be employed, barriers to involvement, perhaps linguistic, (Aronson (1996)) given the high degree
of correlation between Hispanic children and a not speaking English as the primary language at
home of about 0.51, preferences for child skill, and/or returns to child skill. Another potential
explanation that has been suggested in the literature is a cultural reluctance to interfere in what is
viewed as the domain of teachers (Lareau (2000)). When examining heterogeneity by the primary
language spoken at home in table 1.9, I find that the policy has negative effects on reading skills
and non-cognitive skills, but not math skills. In section 1.4.2, I examine whether evidence of policy
heterogeneity on mechanisms can help to explain these heterogeneous effects.
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy on Outcomes by Race
(1) (2) (3)
Math Reading Non-Cognitive
Policy 0.0071∗∗∗ (0.0019) 0.0010 (0.0021) −0.0010 (0.0016)
Policy*Black 0.0075 (0.0050) 0.0069 (0.0052) −0.0020 (0.0036)
Policy*Hispanic −0.0069∗∗∗ (0.0024) −0.0039 (0.0025) −0.0003 (0.0018)
Policy*Other −0.0009 (0.0027) −0.0019 (0.0027) −0.0033 (0.0020)
Black −0.7252∗∗∗ (0.0507) −0.2943∗∗∗ (0.0505) −0.1818∗∗∗ (0.0388)
Hispanic −0.3388∗∗∗ (0.0459) −0.1969∗∗∗ (0.0444) 0.0238 (0.0319)
Other 0.1108∗∗ (0.0501) 0.1885∗∗∗ (0.0449) 0.1521∗∗∗ (0.0337)
Observations 21750 21750 21750
R2 0.48 0.41 0.13
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls have been
suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s
education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken
at home and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical
significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.




Policy 0.0066∗∗∗ (0.0016) 0.0010 (0.0016) −0.0008 (0.0013)
Policy*Non-English −0.0059∗∗∗ (0.0021) −0.0049∗∗ (0.0020) −0.0033∗∗ (0.0015)
Non-English Home Language 0.0175 (0.0477) −0.1543∗∗∗ (0.0474) 0.1917∗∗∗ (0.0341)
Observations 21750 21750 21750
R2 0.48 0.41 0.13
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset. Standard errors
clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls have been suppressed for brevity. The full
set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s education status, annual household income
(000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita,
the unemployment rate, the average weekly welfare benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the
average unemployment insurance claims, and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to
statistical significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
14
Interestingly, despite the propensity for wealthier households to be more likely to be employed,
when analyzing the results in table 1.10, I do not find heterogeneous effects of the policy by
household income. In table 1.11, I also do not find evidence of heterogeneity in the policy by
family structure, despite single parents having a lower probability of being employed.
Table 1.10: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy on Outcomes by Household Income
(1) (2) (3)
Math Reading Non-Cognitive
Policy 0.0046∗∗∗ (0.0015) −0.0007 (0.0015) −0.0019∗ (0.0011)
Policy*Income 0.0014 (0.0016) 0.0012 (0.0014) −0.0009 (0.0013)
Household Income 0.3233∗∗∗ (0.0314) 0.2671∗∗∗ (0.0298) 0.1497∗∗∗ (0.0227)
Observations 21750 21750 21750
R2 0.48 0.41 0.13
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls have been
suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s
education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at
home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average weekly welfare
benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the average unemployment insurance claims,
and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical significance at the
5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 1.11: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy on Outcomes by Family Structure
(1) (2) (3)
Math Reading Non-Cognitive
Policy 0.0033 (0.0026) −0.0004 (0.0027) −0.0024 (0.0017)
Policy*Single Parent 0.0015 (0.0025) −0.0003 (0.0024) 0.0006 (0.0016)
Single Parent 0.0942∗∗ (0.0401) 0.1433∗∗∗ (0.0392) 0.2577∗∗∗ (0.0289)
Observations 21750 21750 21750
R2 0.48 0.41 0.13
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls have been
suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s
education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at
home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average weekly welfare
benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the average unemployment insurance claims, and
year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical significance at the 5%
level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
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1.4.2 Mechanisms
The baseline results show a positive effect of the policy on math scores. In this section, I eval-
uate potential mechanisms through which these policies can affect math scores according to the
empirical specification in equation 1.3. Since the policy is specifically targeted at parental partici-
pation in school-based activities, I evaluate the effect of the policies on different types of parental
involvement, namely, the probability of volunteering, the probability of attending a parent-teacher
conference, the probability of attending a back to school night, the probability of attending a school
event, and the probability of attending a parent-teacher organization or association meeting. I also
consider other potential mechanisms such as the effect on home inputs and maternal employment to
assess the potential for spillovers to the home environment and to assess whether the policy could
induce mothers to work or affect maternal employment decisions through other indirect channels.
Table 1.12 reports the effect of the policy on various measures of parental involvement where
Column (1) reports the probability of volunteering, Column (2) reports the probability of attending
a parent-teacher conference, Column (3) reports the probability of attending a back to school night,
Column (4) reports the probability of attending a school event, and Column (5) reports the proba-
bility of attending a parent-teacher association or parent-teacher organization meeting. I find that
the school-related leave policy has positive effects on the probability of volunteering, attending a
parent-teacher conference and attending a back to school night, with the effect sizes statistically
largest for attending a parent-teacher conference. I do not find an effect on attending a school
event, but find a negative effect of attending a PTA or PTO meeting. The differences in the effect
of the policy across different types of parental involvement activities may speak to the propensity
for them to occur during traditional work hours, though the negative effect on attending a PTA or
PTO meeting is counter intuitive, and could possibly be coming through indirect mechanisms.
I also evaluate the effect of the policy on maternal employment and home inputs in table 1.13
to test whether the policy can induce mothers to work either by making work more attractive
or through other indirect channels, and to test a hypothesis in the literature that greater parental
involvement can lead to an improvement in the home environment (Wherry (2004)), as was found
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Table 1.12: Potential Parental Involvement Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Volunteer Conference Back to School School PTA/PTO
Night Event Meetings
Policy 0.0062∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0042 −0.0068∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0071) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0029)
Observations 21750 21750 21700 21750 21750
Notes: Column (1) reports the probability of volunteering, Column (2) reports the probability of at-
tending a parent-teacher conference, Column (3) reports the probability of attending a back to school
night. Column (4) reports the probability of attending a school event, Column (5) reports the prob-
ability of attending a parent-teacher association or parent-teacher organization meeting and Column
(6) reports the number of meetings at the school the parent attended. Observations have been rounded
to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset. Standard errors clustered at the
school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls have been suppressed for brevity.
The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s education
status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at
home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average weekly
welfare benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the average unemployment
insurance claims, and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to
statistical significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
in Avvisati (2013). I find evidence to suggest that the school-related leave policy matters for both
employment and home inputs with a 1 hour increase in the hours of school related leave allowed
off leading to a 0.006 per cent increase in the probability of employment and a 0.005 standard
deviation increase in the level of home inputs, potentially due to the reasons outlined previously.
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Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with
the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors clustered at the school level are re-
ported in parentheses. The full set of controls have
been suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls
are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared,
mother’s education status, annual household income
(000’s), child race, family structure, primary language
spoken at home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP
per capita, the unemployment rate, the average weekly
welfare benefit, the maximum number of weeks of wel-
fare benefits, and the average unemployment insurance
claims, and year dummies. * refers to statistical signif-
icance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical signif-
icance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical signifi-
cance at the 1% level.
Heterogeneous Mechanisms
In this section, I explore whether heterogeneity in the effects of the policy on potential mech-
anisms can explain the lesser effects of the policy on outcomes for Hispanic individuals and the
negative effects on individuals who do not speak English as the primary language at home. I
present the results in tables 1.14 to 1.17 below.
I first examine heterogeneity in the effect of the policy by race on the various types of parental
involvement in table 1.14. I find that the policy has a lesser effect of attending a parent-teacher
conference for Hispanic students. Seemingly counter to the lesser effect of the policy on outcomes,
I also find that the policy has larger effects for Hispanic students on the probability of attending
a back to school night. Without further information on the signs and magnitudes of the effect of
these mechanisms on outcomes, it is difficult to determine which effect outweighs the other.
Looking at the alternate mechanisms, I also find some evidence that the policy has negative
effects on the probability of maternal employment for Hispanic individuals in table 1.14, however
the effects are very small in magnitude.
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Table 1.14: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy on Mechanisms by Race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Volunteer Conference Back to School School PTA/PTO
Night Event Meetings
Policy 0.0035 0.0615∗∗∗ 0.0099∗ 0.0076∗ −0.0045
(0.0038) (0.0097) (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0039)
Policy*Black −0.0140 −0.0251 0.0035 0.0034 −0.0121
(0.0106) (0.0180) (0.0120) (0.0111) (0.0089)
Policy*Hispanic 0.0035 −0.0263∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗ −0.0022 −0.0045
(0.0040) (0.0100) (0.0062) (0.0052) (0.0039)
Policy*Other 0.0079∗ −0.0335∗∗∗ 0.0057 −0.0106∗ −0.0011
(0.0046) (0.0112) (0.0069) (0.0057) (0.0042)
Black −0.3852∗∗∗ 0.3597∗∗ −0.3429∗∗∗ −0.4299∗∗∗ 0.7324∗∗∗
(0.0892) (0.1723) (0.0940) (0.1048) (0.0879)
Hispanic −0.3251∗∗∗ 0.1593 −0.0432 −0.0417 0.1714∗∗
(0.0800) (0.1424) (0.0963) (0.0935) (0.0728)
Other −0.4840∗∗∗ 0.5879∗∗∗ −0.4843∗∗∗ −0.3370∗∗∗ 0.1256
(0.0880) (0.1623) (0.1041) (0.0974) (0.0815)
Observations 21750 21750 21700 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use
dataset. Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of con-
trols have been suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s
age squared, mother’s education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure,
primary language spoken at home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment
rate, the average weekly welfare benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the av-
erage unemployment insurance claims, and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10%
level, ** refers to statistical significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1%
level.
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Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the
requirements of using the restricted-use dataset. Standard
errors clustered at the school level are reported in paren-
theses. The full set of controls have been suppressed for
brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s
age, mother’s age squared, mother’s education status, annual
household income (000’s), child race, family structure, pri-
mary language spoken at home, state-level expenditure per
pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average
weekly welfare benefit, the maximum number of weeks of
welfare benefits, and the average unemployment insurance
claims, and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance
at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical significance at the 5%
level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 1.16: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy on Mechanisms by Primary Language Spoken at
Home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Volunteer Conference Back to School School PTA/PTO
Night Event Meetings
Policy 0.0021 0.0442∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0021 −0.0070∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0077) (0.0042) (0.0038) (0.0033)
Policy*Non-English 0.0116∗∗∗ −0.0095 0.0035 0.0042 0.0006
(0.0036) (0.0066) (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0035)
Non-English −0.6386∗∗∗ −0.0215 −0.5723∗∗∗ −0.5869∗∗∗ 0.4112∗∗∗
(0.0853) (0.1286) (0.1033) (0.1003) (0.0816)
Observations 21750 21750 21700 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls have been
suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s
education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at
home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average weekly welfare
benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the average unemployment insurance claims,
and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical significance at
the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
Counter to the negative effects of the policy for individuals who do not speak English as the
primary language at home, I find that the policy has a positive effect on volunteering at school
relative to individuals who do not speak English as the primary language spoken at home in table
1.16. I do not find any heterogeneous effects of the policy on the alternate mechanisms considered
in table 1.17.
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Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of
using the restricted-use dataset. Standard errors clustered at the school level
are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls have been suppressed
for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s
age squared, mother’s education status, annual household income (000’s),
child race, family structure, primary language spoken at home, state-level
expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average
weekly welfare benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits,
and the average unemployment insurance claims, and year dummies. * refers
to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical significance
at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
I briefly discuss some of the heterogeneous effects of the policy on mechanisms along the
previous dimensions considered. For the sake of brevity, I only present the results where I find
evidence of heterogeneity in the effects of the policy on the mechanisms of interest.
I find limited evidence that the policy has heterogeneous effects on the various types of parental
involvement by grade in table 1.18. Interestingly, whereas I do not find evidence of the policy in
the baseline model, I find that the policy has positive effects on the probability of attending a school
event in grade 3.
I also find limited evidence to suggest heterogeneity in the effect of the policy on mechanisms
by maternal education status, with the exception of a less negative effect of the policy on attending
a PTA/PTO Meetings in table 1.19.
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Table 1.18: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy on Mechanisms by Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Volunteer Conference Back to School School PTA/PTO
Night Event Meetings
Policy 0.0071∗∗ 0.0408∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0013 −0.0047
(0.0033) (0.0077) (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0031)
Policy*Grade 2 −0.0005 −0.0060 0.0039 0.0028 −0.0027
(0.0024) (0.0057) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0020)
Policy*Grade 3 −0.0028 0.0036 0.0077 0.0082∗∗ −0.0045∗
(0.0025) (0.0061) (0.0048) (0.0036) (0.0023)
Grade 2 −0.2246∗∗∗ −0.4432∗∗∗ −0.2203∗∗∗ −0.1707∗∗∗ 0.0199
(0.0454) (0.0880) (0.0595) (0.0631) (0.0427)
Grade 3 −0.4193∗∗∗ −0.9945∗∗∗ −0.0246 −0.3498∗∗∗ 0.0156
(0.1057) (0.2019) (0.1310) (0.1350) (0.1099)
Observations 21750 21750 21700 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use
dataset. Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls
have been suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s
age squared, mother’s education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure,
primary language spoken at home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment
rate, the average weekly welfare benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the
average unemployment insurance claims, and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the
10% level, ** refers to statistical significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the
1% level.
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Table 1.19: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy on Mechanisms by Education Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Volunteer Conference Back to School School PTA/PTO
Night Event Meetings
Policy 0.0061∗ 0.0345∗∗∗ 0.0199∗∗∗ 0.0059∗ −0.0107∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0078) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0032)
Policy*College 0.0041 0.0105 −0.0070 −0.0010 0.0074∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0066) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0034)
Policy*Bachelors −0.0032 0.0130 −0.0012 −0.0068 0.0051
(0.0042) (0.0083) (0.0055) (0.0049) (0.0036)
Some College 0.3202∗∗∗ 0.2156∗∗ 0.4851∗∗∗ 0.4916∗∗∗ −0.0216
(0.0593) (0.0887) (0.0732) (0.0661) (0.0543)
Bachelors or Higher 0.7753∗∗∗ 0.6636∗∗∗ 0.7648∗∗∗ 0.9463∗∗∗ 0.1344∗∗
(0.0688) (0.1290) (0.0866) (0.0922) (0.0604)
Observations 21750 21750 21700 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls have been
suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s
education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at
home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average weekly welfare
benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the average unemployment insurance claims,
and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical significance at
the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
I find limited evidence to suggest that there is heterogeneity in the effect of the policy by
household income on various forms of parental involvement in table 1.20. Specifically, I find that
the policy has negative effects on the probability of attending a school event for individuals in
higher income brackets.
Overall, despite finding evidence of heterogeneity in the effects of the policies on outcomes,
particularly for Hispanic individuals and individuals who do not speak English as the primary
language at home, I find limited evidence of heterogeneity in the effect of the policy on the various
potential mechanisms captured in the dataset. It is possible that the negative effects of the policy
could be operating through mechanisms not captured in the dataset, that disproportionately affect
individuals who do not speak English as the primary language at home.
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Table 1.20: Heterogeneous Effects of the Policy on Mechanisms by Household Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Volunteer Conference Back to School School PTA/PTO
Night Event Meetings
Policy 0.0058∗ 0.0410∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0020 −0.0068∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0073) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0029)
Policy*Income −0.0054∗ 0.0071 −0.0065 −0.0095∗∗ 0.0012
(0.0032) (0.0070) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0027)
Household Income 0.7058∗∗∗ 0.2642∗∗ 0.4751∗∗∗ 0.7075∗∗∗ 0.1783∗∗∗
(0.0564) (0.1076) (0.0770) (0.0808) (0.0516)
Observations 21750 21750 21700 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. The full set of controls have been
suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s
education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at
home, state-level expenditure per pupil, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the average weekly welfare
benefit, the maximum number of weeks of welfare benefits, and the average unemployment insurance claims,
and year dummies. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical significance at
the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
1.5 Conclusion
Facilitating increased contact between parents and teachers in an effort to improve outcomes
has been the cornerstone of United States education policy for the past two decades. Given the
centrality of parental involvement to national education policy, policy makers have expended a
considerable degree of effort to design and implement policies aimed at addressing the most salient
barriers to parental involvement, chief of which is an inability to get the time off of work. In
response to this, 14 states have implemented a policy and a further 4 states currently have pending
bills that would allow parents time off from their place of work to participate in their child’s
schooling. Despite the popularity of the policy, to the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical
evidence of the effects of the policy, or on its associated mechanisms. By exploiting access to a
rich data set with the ability to be linked to these state-level policies, I am both able to quantify
the total effects of the policies and speak to some mechanisms through which the policy is likely
affecting outcomes.
I find support for positive effects of the policy on math skills and limited evidence for effects
on reading and non-cognitive skills. I find that the policy positively affects various dimensions
25
of parental involvement such as volunteering, attending a parent teacher conference, and attend-
ing a back to school night. I additionally find positive effects on other inputs such as maternal
employment and home inputs.
In the context of the current policy climate with fourteen states currently having the policy in
place and a further four states proposing bills to introduce this policy, my research can serve as a
source of information to policy makers as well as a foundation from which further analysis of the
effects and mechanisms of the policy can be studied.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECT OF PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT ON STUDENT OUTCOMES
2.1 Introduction
Increasing the level of parental involvement in schools as a means to improving outcomes and
reducing achievement gaps has been central to United States education policy over the past two
decades. Recent federal education acts such as the current 2015 Every Student Succeeds Act and
the preceding 2001 No Child Left Behind Act have cemented parental involvement as a national
education priority by tying the receipt of federal funds to implementing parent involvement activ-
ities. Under the current act, districts in receipt of Title 1 funds are required to implement parental
involvement programs, activities and procedures, and those in receipt of in excess of $500,000 are
required to earmark 1% of these funds for parental involvement activities. In the year 2017, this
amounted to the federal government spending an estimated $133,000,000 on parental involvement
activities.1 Using a large nationally representative survey, this paper recovers the causal effect
of parental involvement on child outcomes by addressing the non-random nature of parental in-
volvement and accounting for the inter-dependence between parental involvement and other input
decisions relevant to child skill production. This paper also studies the effects of existing state-
level policies that allow parents time off from their place of work to participate in their child’s
schooling.
Thus far the literature has struggled to identify the causal effect of parental involvement due
to issues of selection and the omission of relevant variables to child skill production and parental
involvement decisions. The former stems from the likely presence of unobserved inputs that have
the potential to influence both the parental involvement and child skill decision leading to a biased
1The figure was computed using Title 1 federal allocations by district provided by the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion. The figure assumes that actual allocations were as reported in the data and that there was an 100% compliance
rate.
estimate of the effect of parental involvement on child outcomes. For instance, parents of inher-
ently higher (unobserved) ability children may both have a higher level of parental involvement
and have higher skilled children leading to an upward bias in the effect of parental involvement.
Conversely, parents may compensate for having an inherently low (unobserved) ability child by
having a high level of parental involvement leading to a downward bias in the effect of parental
involvement. Similarly, failure to account for the effect of other related inputs may lead to an
over or understating of the effect of parental involvement. For instance, an increase in parental
involvement may lead to a reduction in other competing productive uses of the parents’ time such
as employment or home input decisions with ambiguous effects on child skill development. By
modeling parental involvement, maternal employment, fertility and home inputs as a set of inter-
related parental input decisions and using econometric techniques to correct for the non-random
nature of parental involvement and other related inputs, this paper is able to recover the causal
effect of parental involvement.
Policies designed to increase parental involvement can affect other inputs directly, as well as
indirectly through the effect of changing parental involvement on other inputs with ambiguous total
effects on child skill. For instance, the existing state-level policies that allow parents time off from
work to participate in their child’s schooling may lead to an increase in parental involvement, but
it may also directly lead to increases in maternal employment. Additionally, increasing the level of
parental involvement may lead to reductions in home inputs and employment due to parental time
constraints. Quantifying the total effect of these policies requires accounting for both these direct
and indirect channels. By specifying and estimating a sufficiently rich model that (1) captures the
inter-dependence of inputs, (2) models the dependence of these inputs on policies, and (3) recovers
causal effects of these inputs on child skill, this paper is able to evaluate the total effects of policies
designed to reduce the barriers parents face to involvement.
I develop my empirical specification from a theoretical model similar to the Hanushek (1986)
and Becker and Tomes (1979) models where parents value consumption, leisure and their child’s
human capital. I extend the previous models to consider parental involvement as an investment
in human capital and non-cognitive skills and allow for parents to derive utility from their child’s
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non-cognitive skills in addition to their child’s human capital. I present the model from the stand-
point of a forward-looking utility maximizing household with the mother as the decision-making
agent making choices over parental involvement, home inputs, fertility and employment decisions
as inputs into child skill formation each period. I include home inputs, fertility and employment
decisions as these have the potential to both affect and be affected by parental involvement de-
cisions and have been shown to be relevant for child skill formation (Del Boca (2014); Bernal
(2008)). By treating parental inputs as sequential per period decisions made simultaneously within
each period, I am able to capture both the contemporaneous trade-offs parents face in terms of
competing productive uses of their time as well as the dynamic effects of parental input decisions.
From the theoretical model, I derive approximations to the parental involvement and other related
input decisions as a linear function of all information available to the mother at the time of her
making her input decisions.
In my empirical specification, I control for several sources of unobserved heterogeneity that can
potentially bias results including mother/child permanent unobserved heterogeneity, such as unob-
served child ability, mother/child time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, such as health shocks
to the child or mother, and show relative robustness to the inclusion of school-level permanent
unobserved heterogeneity. I account for these forms of heterogeneity by using a random effects
specification that categorizes mother/child permanent unobserved heterogeneity and mother/child
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity into a discrete number of family types and shocks, respec-
tively. I include these terms directly in the input decisions and skill equations and allow for cor-
relation in the error terms across equations and time. The direct inclusion of these terms resolves
the omitted variable bias problem stemming from the omission of these unobserved inputs that
likely both affect input decisions and skill formation. In addition to including these terms, I use
exclusion restrictions derived from the theoretical model to identify the causal effect of parental
involvement. The exclusion restrictions are assumed to be correlated with input decisions but
conditional on these input decisions do not directly affect skill formation, making them valid ex-
ogenous shifters of input decisions. In generating my exclusion restrictions, I exploit the ability
to link the dataset to state-level variables and rely on a novel source of identification by exploiting
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plausibly exogenous variation in an employment-based law that allows parents time off from their
place of work to participate in their child’s schooling, in addition to labor market characteristics,
and state welfare, child-care, and taxation policies.
I find evidence of a positive and statistically significant effect of parental involvement, as mea-
sured by volunteering at school, on math, reading, and non-cognitive skills of 0.04, 0.04, and 0.05
standard deviations, respectively. To get an idea of these magnitudes, the effect sizes are com-
parable to 19%, 17%, and 64%, respectively, of the direct effect of a mother having a bachelor’s
degree or higher. The effect sizes are of the same sign but larger in magnitude when compared with
the baseline OLS model. By contrast, when analyzing parent-teacher conferences as the measure
of parental involvement, I find stark differences in math and reading skills between the baseline
OLS results and the results from the model that corrects for the endogeneity of parental involve-
ment and other input decisions. I find a negative and statistically significant effect of attending a
parent-teacher conference on reading skills in the baseline OLS model of 0.05 standard deviations,
however this effect becomes insignificant when the endogeneity of the parent-teacher conference
decision is accounted for. Similarly, I find an insignificant effect of attending parent-teacher con-
ferences on math skills in the baseline OLS model compared with a positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect of 0.04 standard deviations in the model correcting for selection, though only at
the 10% level. The results are consistent with a negative selection mechanism whereby parents of
lower ability children are more likely to attend parent-teacher conferences, leading to a downward
bias in OLS estimates. Conversely, I find negative effects of attending a parent-teacher conference
on non-cognitive skills for both specifications of 0.07 standard deviations in the baseline OLS
model and 0.06 standard deviations in the model that corrects for the endogeneity of the parent-
teacher conference decision. I additionally find evidence of a dynamic positive effect of lagged
volunteering on contemporaneous home inputs which subsequently affect child skill.
Using my estimated empirical model, I simulate the effects of a policy aimed at reducing the
primary impediment to parental involvement, informed by the most frequent reason parents report
have made it harder to participate in their child’s schooling as captured by my dataset. Because
parents report “cannot get the time off of work” as the primary reason hindering their participation,
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I focus on existing state-level policies that allow parents time off from their place of work to
participate in their child’s schooling, providing the first evaluation of this policy. Quantifying the
effects of the policy is a timely and relevant exercise given that 14 states currently have the policy
implemented and a further four currently have pending bills.2 I find that allowing parents 40 hours
off of work in leads to increases in non-cognitive skills over the life cycle of the child primarily
through increasing the level of volunteering.
I make several important contributions to several strands of the literature. First, I contribute
to the literature on the effects of parental involvement by dealing with endogeneity due to selec-
tion on unobservables and accounting for the effect of other related input decisions allowing for
consistent estimates of the effect of parental involvement on child outcomes to be recovered. My
research complements prior papers that have implemented strategies to deal with the endogeneity
of parental involvement such as Avvisati (2013) who exploit a randomized experiment in French
middle schools and De Fraja and Zanchi (2010) who consider the effect of a construct similar to
parental involvement on the probability of the child obtaining a UK GCSE qualification at age
16-17 using a three-stage least squares approach. My research also builds upon prior work in
the education literature that has documented associations between parental involvement and child
outcomes with estimates ranging from positive (Domina (2005); Jeynes (2005); Stewart (2008);
Shumow and Miller (2001)), to negative (Izzo (1999)), to no effects (Domina (2005); Bobbett
(1995)).
Second, I contribute to the literature by providing, to the best of my knowledge, the first evalu-
ation of the effect of policies geared at facilitating parental involvement on child outcomes. Efforts
to facilitate greater contact between parents and schools have been made at the national, state,
district and school level, yet there is no evidence as to whether these policies have their intended
effects. By exploiting the ability to link my dataset to state-level policies in combination with
my empirical strategies, I am able to quantify the effects of policies aimed at facilitating greater
2The states that currently have school-related leave laws are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia in
addition to District of Columbia. The states that currently have pending bills are New York, New Jersey, Connecticut,
and Michigan.
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parent-school contact highlighting increases in parental involvement as the primary mechanism.
Third, I contribute to the economics literature that has largely analyzed the effect of home in-
puts on child cognitive and non-cognitive skill development, by demonstrating the effect of parental
involvement on home inputs. For instance, Bernal (2008), Del Boca (2014), Fiorini and Keane
(2014), Del Bono (2016), Cunha and Heckman (2008), and Wolpin and Todd (2007) all demon-
strate the importance of various measures or proxies of home inputs to child skill development.
I complement the existing literature by considering an alternate form of parental inputs that has
been positively associated with child skill and an increase in home inputs, and is the subject of
recent national education policy. Prior papers have alluded to the changing nature of the child
skill production function when the child begins formal schooling, as the primary learning environ-
ment shifts from the home to the school and other agents become relevant to child skill formation
(Del Boca (2014); Bernal (2008)), but have not considered the effect of other parental inputs that
are relevant to this stage of the child’s life. My research extends the literature by demonstrating the
role parental involvement plays when the child comes of school age in addition to showing how
parental involvement can affect home inputs which have traditionally been the focus of study in
the literature.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows, Section 2.2 discusses the data to be used in the esti-
mation and why it is well-suited for this analysis. Section 2.3 describes the theoretical model that
serves as a basis for the empirical section. Section 2.4 gives the empirical specification, discussing
estimation and identification. Section 2.5 gives results. Section 2.6 discusses the effects of policy
simulations and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Data
The dataset used for this analysis is the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten
Class (ECLS-K), a nationally representative sample of kindergarteners in the United States who
began kindergarten in the fall of 2010. The ECLS-K is a longitudinal survey of children, including
detailed information on their parents, schools and teachers. The survey collects information on
home and school inputs, in addition to cognitive and non-cognitive measures for children, making
the dataset well-suited to this analysis. The restricted use ECLS-K dataset contains information
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on the state of residence of the child, allowing the dataset to be merged with other geocoded
datasets on welfare benefits, employment legislation, labor market conditions, tax rates, and child
care subsidies which are useful for identifying the parameters of interest and evaluating the effects
of policy. There are currently four main waves of data: the fall (2010) and spring (2011) of
kindergarten, the spring of grade 1 (2012),3 the spring of grade 2 (2013), and the spring of grade
3 (2014) with the spring of grades 4 (2015) and 5 (2016) forthcoming. The initial sample in the
fall of kindergarten consisted of approximately 18200 children, however there was attrition in the
survey with each additional wave (See Appendix Table F.2.1).
The sample I use for this analysis makes use of the spring of kindergarten,4 the spring of grade
1, the spring of grade 2, and the spring of grade 3. In constructing my estimation sample, I drop
individuals if they are missing data on outcome variables and key input variables such as math,
reading and non-cognitive scores in addition to data on home inputs, the number of other children,
parental involvement measures, and maternal employment decisions. Since part of my robustness
checks rely on variation within a school, I drop observations where I only observe one individual
per school.5 For individuals who are missing information on exogenous characteristics, I include
a dummy variable to indicate the presence of missing data for continuous variables, and include a
missing data category for categorical variables. I drop individuals who are not observed in the fall
of kindergarten, since key variables of interest are only asked in the fall. I also drop individuals
who are retained in any grade since I do not model the retention decision. Similarly, since I do not
model the decision to change schools each period, I retain individuals until they change schools
and consider them as having attrited after they change schools.6 I compare key variables from the
original and estimation sample in Appendix Tables F.2.2 to F.2.4 to indicate how the two samples
3A small sub-sample of the children were surveyed in the fall of grade 1 and the fall of grade 2.
4Information from the spring of kindergarten is used for initial information about the child. I do not use the fall of
kindergarten as the initial period as key variables of interest were not collected during the fall period.
5In order to retain a reasonable sample size, I impute non-cognitive scores for individuals who have math and
reading scores but are missing non-cognitive scores using predicted values from linear regressions.
6The proportion of children changing schools over each wave are as follows: Wave 1 to Wave 2: 1.74 %, Wave 2
to Wave 3: 8.85%, Wave 3 to Wave 4: 14.39%, Wave 4 to Wave 5: 21.40%
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compare after the restrictions are imposed. I standardize the measure of home inputs and the cogni-
tive and non-cognitive scores for ease of interpretation. Cognitive scores are standardized relative
to kindergarten levels as the scores are constructed to be horizontally comparable across grades. I
measure parental involvement using two binary variables: whether the parent volunteers at school
or not and whether the parent attended a parent-teacher conference or not, both as reported by the
parent, aimed at capturing different dimensions of parental involvement in schools. One concern is
that parents may be constrained by the availability of opportunities to volunteer, however, in figure
G.2.1 in the Appendix, I provide suggestive evidence that this is unlikely to hold by presenting
parents’ reports on how satisfied they are with being made aware of opportunities to volunteer. As
can be seen from the figure, relatively few parents report dissatisfaction with being made aware of
opportunities to volunteer. Similarly, I argue that parents are unlikely to be constrained by oppor-
tunities to attend parent-teacher conferences as reflected by the high degree of parents that report
attending parent-teacher conferences (See table F.2.4). Nevertheless, I present supporting evidence
that they are unlikely to be constrained by opportunities by showing how often the schools hold
parent-teacher conferences as reported by the school in figure G.2.2 in the Appendix.
I define home inputs as activities parents partake in with their children outside the realm of the
school.7 The construct of home inputs is the simple average of four variables: the frequency the
child reads books, whether the child participates in extra-curricular activities, whether the number
of hours of TV watched on a weekday is above or below the sample median, and how often the
family eats dinner together.8 The average of the standardized home input index and summary
7One concern is that parental inputs at home and parental involvement at school may be both proxying for under-
lying latent parenting quality, however, I provide theoretical and empirical evidence that suggests the two are distinct
constructs. Firstly, parental involvement at school is an established concept in the education literature, and is treated
as a distinct concept from home inputs. Secondly, the theoretical existence of these as two separate dimensions of
parental inputs is validated statistically as suggested by the presence of two distinct factors when all variables are put
together, one that loads more on variables used in the construction of home inputs and one that loads more on variables
used in the parental involvement measure. Lastly, the correlation between volunteering at school and home inputs is
0.13, 0.15, 0.14, and 0.16 across the four waves, and the correlation between attending a parent-teacher conference
and home inputs are 0.04, 0.07, 0.06, and 0.06, a relatively lower degree of correlation than one would expect if the
two measures were capturing the same underlying dimension of parenting skill.
8I constrained my construct to variables that were available across all four waves for consistency in interpretation
of the construct.
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statistics of the variables used to construct the index are presented in Appendix table F.2.4.
Non-cognitive skills are extracted as a latent factor from the following teacher-reported mea-
sures: Approaches to learning, Self-control, Inter-personal skills, Externalizing and Internalizing
problem behaviours, Inhibitory Control and Attentional Focus. I aggregate these measures into a
single index using polychoric analysis for convenience and to reduce the number of parameters to
be estimated. I outline the procedure used to aggregate the non-cognitive scores in section A.2.1
of the appendix. The factor loadings associated with these variables are shown in Appendix Table
F.2.5. Approaches to Learning and Self-control are the variables that load most highly onto the
non-cognitive factor across all four waves.
Cognitive skills are measured by Item Response Theory (IRT) math and reading scores based
on standardized cognitive tests collected as part of the ECLS-K survey. I discuss the advantages of
using IRT test scores in section A.2.1 of the Appendix.
2.3 Theoretical Model
In this section I describe a model of human capital formation that highlights some direct and
indirect ways in which parental involvement can affect child outcomes based on mechanisms
highlighted in the economics and education literatures. The model developed here is based on
the Hanushek (1986) and Becker and Tomes (1979) models in which parents value consumption,
leisure and their child’s human capital and face trade-offs in deciding between investments in their
child and their own consumption. I highlight some key characteristics of the model below. First,
I allow parental involvement to be an additional form of parental investment once the child enters
formal schooling, complementing previous work that has focused on a uni-dimensional measure of
parental inputs. Second, by modeling the parents’ other time commitments such as employment,
home input, and fertility decisions, I capture the trade-offs parents face when deciding their level
of involvement. Third, by modeling the input decisions as per-period sequential decisions, I ac-
count for the dynamic effects of input decisions and the subsequent effects on child skill formation.
Last, I allow parents to derive utility from their child’s non-cognitive skills extending the previous
models that focused exclusively on cognitive skills. In the theoretical model, I treat the household
as a unitary decision maker. Specifically, I model decisions from the perspective of the mother and
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abstract away from issues of intra-household bargaining.9
2.3.1 Human Capital and Non-Cognitive Skill Production Function
I first specify a model of child skill development where i refers to the child, s refers to the
school and t refers to the time. I assume that child i in school s at time 0 is born with an initial
human capital endowmentAcis0, which is measured by the child’s performance on math and reading
cognitive tests taken in the spring of kindergarten. Similarly, I assume the child’s initial non-
cognitive skill endowment, Anis0, is the child’s non-cognitive skill based on teacher reports in the
spring of kindergarten. Each period t, corresponding to a year, the child’s human capital and non-
cognitive skills evolve according to production functions specified below. I model the production
functions as value-added production functions where the child’s stock of skills of type k at the
end of the period, Akist, is assumed to be a function of the child’s prior level of cognitive and non-
cognitive skills, the inputs determined by the parents, and family socio-economic and demographic
characteristics. In my empirical specifications, I do not include both lagged math and reading skills
in the same specification due to the high degree of correlation between these two variables. In this
specification, the prior level of skill is assumed to be a sufficient statistic for the child’s initial skill
endowment, Akis0, as well as all prior inputs.
10
In order to conserve on notation, I denote my two measures of parental involvement, volunteer-
ing at school, I1ist, and attending a parent-teacher conference, I
2





and jointly refer to them as parental involvement in school. In addition to parent involvement in
school, Iist, I include other relevant jointly determined inputs such as home inputs, Hist, the ma-
ternal employment decision, Eist, and the number of other children in the household, Kist. Home
inputs capture important dimensions of the quality of the home environment and the mother’s
9The assumption that the mother makes the decisions is not an unreasonable one. In the previous version of this
survey, the question was asked as to who participated in activities at the child’s school, 15.6% of respondents reported
that mothers attended PTA meetings compared with 1.6% that reported fathers and 4.6% reported both parents. The
comparable figures for attending a back to school night were 32.7%, 5.3% and 22.2%, respectively. The comparable
figures for attending a parent-teacher conference were 19.1%, 2.5%, and 8.4%, respectively. The comparable figures
for attending a school event were 16.0%, 2.4%, 25.4%, respectively. The comparable figures for volunteering are
20.0%, 1.6%, and 5.3%.
10This result can be derived by recursive substitution as per Wolpin and Todd (2003)
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other time commitments, whereas maternal employment and the number of siblings in the house-
hold capture dimensions of the mother’s other time commitments. In addition to inputs, I include
family socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the child, parents, and household de-
noted by the vector Xist. The vector Xist includes household income, the mother’s age and age
squared, family structure, the primary language spoken at home, the child’s gender and race, and
the mother’s education status. The error term in the production function equation for skill k com-
prises time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the child/mother, µkis, time varying unobserved
heterogeneity of the child/mother, νkist, as well as an idiosyncratic error term capturing idiosyn-
cratic shocks and measurement error εkist.






















































The model begins when the child first enters kindergarten and ends when the child completes
grade 3. The household makes decisions in the spring of grade 1 (t=1), the spring of grade 2 (t=2),
and the spring of grade 3 (t=3), taking the spring of kindergarten (t=0) as the initial period. The
parent comes into the period observing past realizations of skills, consumption, leisure, involve-
ment, home input, fertility and employment, and her current policy and labour market environment.
Given the information available to her and her preferences and constraints, the parent then makes
consumption, cist, leisure, list, employment, Eist, fertility, Kist, specifically whether to keep the
number of siblings the same (k = 1), increase the number of siblings, (k = 2), or decrease the
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number of siblings, (k = 3), home input, Hist, and involvement decisions, Iist. I denote the vector
of the mother’s input decisions by dist = (Eist, Iist, Hist, Kist).
2.3.3 Per-period utility and constraints
Consistent with the Becker and Tomes (1979) model, I assume the mother derives utility from
her consumption, cist, leisure, list, and her child’s vector of human capital and non-cognitive skills,
Aist. I also assume the mother faces utility costs associated with her input decisions at time t, dist. I
allow preference and cost parameters, captured by the vector αist, to depend on observable charac-
teristics of the mother/child,Xist, the mother’s input decisions in the prior period dist−1, permanent
unobservable characteristics of the mother/child, µis, and time-varying unobserved characteristics
of the mother/child, νist. The inclusion of observable characteristics as cost and utility shifters
allows for differing preference for consumption, leisure, and child skill along dimensions such as
race, income, family structure, and maternal education status, and differing costs of inputs along
these same dimensions. Similarly, the inclusion of unobserved characteristics as cost and utility
shifters allow for differing preference for consumption, leisure, and child skill, and differing utility
costs along dimensions unobserved to the researcher. The inclusion of lagged decisions as cost
and utility shifters allows for the utility or disutility associated with the input decisions to depend
on whether and to what extent the mother has engaged in them previously. The per period utility
function can be specified as follows:




ist, Iist, Hist, Kist, Eist;αist) (2.3)
where αist = g(Xist, dist−1, µist, νist)
Each period, the mother maximizes the present value of her expected utility subject to budget
and time constraints in addition to the child’s skill production functions given in equations 1.1
and 1.2. Normalizing the mother’s time endowment to 1, her per period time constraint can be
specified as follows:
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1 = list + hist + Iist +Hist (2.4)
where list is the mother’s leisure time, hist is the hours of work of the mother, Iist is time
devoted to parental involvement at school, and Hist is time devoted to home inputs. Normalizing
the price of the consumption good to 1, the budget constraint is given by:
cist + nist(Xist, Kist, Jist) = wisthist +Oist +Bist(Kist, Xist, Rist) (2.5)
where cist is aggregate consumption, nist is expenditure on child care that is dependent on
the number of children, Kist, income and family structure captured in Xist, and state availability
of child care and state policies on child care subsidies, Jist, wist is the wage rate of the mother,
hist are the hours of work for the mother. Oist represents other sources of income such as the
mother’s partner’s income, if present, child support payments and gifts. Bist represents other
transfers received by the household such as welfare transfers or tax credits that are dependent on
characteristics of the household, such as the number of children, Kist, income and family structure
captured in Xist, and state policies on taxation and welfare, Rist. The mother’s wage if she works
and the latent wage offer if she does not work is assumed to be drawn from a distribution which
depends on state local labour market conditions, List, the mother’s prior employment, Eist−1, as
well as observed characteristics such as the mother’s age, race, education status, and permanent
unobserved characteristics of the mother, Xist and µwis, respectively according to:
wist ∼ F (List, Xist, Eist−1, µwis) (2.6)
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2.3.4 Dynamic Problem
At the beginning of period 0, the mother/child draws a permanent type, µis, that affects maternal
preferences, the child skills technology, and wage offers. The permanent type captures groups
of mothers/children that differ in similar ways due to omitted characteristics and or inputs not
observed by the researcher. The mother enters each period observing her child’s current stock of
skill at the end of period t − 1, Aist−1, her past consumption, leisure, employment, home input,
involvement, and fertility decisions, cist−1, list−1, dist−1, her current observable characteristics in
addition to her permanent type. After observing her state space, the wage offer,wist, including local
labour market conditions, List, child care availability and subsidy rules Jist, social welfare and tax
rules Rist, other sources of income Oist, and the general policy environment Qist, are realised.
Subsequent to this, the time-varying shock, νist occurs. The mother then makes her subsequent
consumption, leisure, employment, fertility, home input, and involvement decisions, and the child
skills and history of input decisions are updated forming the state space for the beginning of the
next period. Defining Ωt = (Aist−1, cist−1, list−1, dist−1, Xist) as the mother’s state space at time
t, the mother chooses an alternative vector (cist, list, dist) from the set of possible alternatives to
maximise her current utility plus the discounted expected value of her future utility where the
expectation is taken over the future wage offers, other sources of income, labour market conditions,
welfare and taxation rules, availability of child care and state child care subsidy rules, the general
policy environment, shocks to child skill, and to utility. The decision making process within a
period can be summarized in the figure below:


















entering period t+ 1
Ωt+1 =
(Aist, cist, list, dist, Xist+1)
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2.3.5 Approximation to the solution of the parent’s problem
Since the mother is a forward-looking individual and since choices today affect future maternal
utility directly through the evolution of child skill, and indirectly through their effects on contem-
poraneous input decisions, the mother’s choice is inherently dynamic. Each period t the mother
makes decisions dist, cist, and list that maximize the present discounted value of her expected life-
time utility consisting of the current utility plus the discounted maximised expected future utility.
The terminal value function VT+1(ΩisT+1|wisT+1, RisT+1, OisT+1, QisT+1, JisT+1) is the discounted
expected continuation utility of the state variables and exogenous factors at time T + 1.
In period t, the mother’s dynamic problem is:
Vt(Ωist|wist, Rist, Qist, Oist, Jist) = max
dist,cist,list
U(cist, list, Aist, dist, dist−1, Xist, µis, νist)
+βEist
[
Vt+1(Ωist+1|wist+1, Rist+1, Oist+1, Qist+1, Jist+1)
] (2.7)
subject to the skill production functions and the budget and time constraints.
In order to solve the full model and recover the functional forms of the demand functions,
the functional forms of the utility and production functions, the distribution of the wage variable,
and the continuation value function, the evolution of the mother’s beliefs must be specified. The
value function would then need to be computed at each period over many combinations of the state
space. Given that the state space includes several continuously distributed variables, it would be
computationally intractable to compute the value function at each possible value. Approximations
to the decision rules sidesteps these computational issues whilst still capturing important features
of the model.11 For instance by approximating general forms of the input demand functions, I
am still able to capture the dynamics of input decisions without having to solve the model fully,
11Two papers in the literature have employed fully structural approaches when analyzing the effect of parental inputs
on child cognitive development. Bernal (2008) assumes a cumulative production function, avoiding the problem of
having lagged skill entering the state space. Additionally, her control variables are child care use and employment
status which are inherently discrete. Del Boca (2014) also sidestep the issue of child skill in the state space by placing
restrictive functional form assumptions on the child skill production function that result in decision rules that have
the undesirable feature of being independent of current child skill. This would for instance negate feedback effects
whereby parents use past realization of skills to inform their current input deicions.
41
which would entail making potentially restrictive assumptions on the form of the utility function
and what the mother knows about the production function for child human capital, the wage offer,
state welfare and taxation policies, child care availability and subsidies, and welfare rules. The
approximation also allows the number of children to enter the model in a flexible way by affecting
all input decisions and child skill formation without having to specify maternal preferences for
the skill distribution among her children which is problematic here as human capital development
measures are only present for the focal child.
I estimate general forms of the demand functions by expressing each input decision as a general
function of the state space and information acquired during the period prior to the mother making
her decision. Since all decisions are made simultaneously with the same information available to
the mother, each input decision is a function of the same variables. I use a linear approximation
for the decision rules, expressing them as a function of the state space, Ωist, the policy, welfare
and taxation rules, other sources of income, chid care rules and availability, and the labour mar-
ket environment, denoted by the vector Zist = (List, Rist, Oist, Qist, Jist), permanent unobserved
heterogeneity, µis, time-varying shocks, νist, and idiosyncratic errors, εist.
2.4 Empirical Framework
The primary interest of this study is the direct effect of parental involvement at school on
child cognitive and non-cognitive skills captured by γc2 and γ
n
2 as shown in equations 1.1 and
1.2. Of additional interest is the potential dynamic effect of parental involvement on home input
decisions that has been discussed in the literature (Wherry (2004)) but never shown empirically.
Estimation of the main parameters of interest, γc2 and γ
n
2 by OLS would likely lead to biased
coefficients due to the endogeneity of the parental involvement decision stemming from the likely
presence of omitted unobserved inputs and reverse causality. Similar issues of omitted unobserved
inputs prevents ascribing a causal interpretation to the coefficients on home inputs, employment
and fertility decisions. Lastly, the coefficients on the lagged skills are likely biased due to the
presence of permanent unobserved heterogeneity, which by definition affects skills in all periods,
and introduces correlation between lagged skills and the composite error term.
For instance, the coefficients on parental involvement in the child skill equations will be biased
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upwards if higher skilled parents are both more likely to have higher skilled children and to have a
higher level of parental involvement due to the presence of unobserved inputs at the mother/child
level. Alternately, the coefficient on parental involvement is likely biased downward if there is
an issue of reverse causality where parents increase their level of involvement in their child’s
schooling subsequent to their child doing poorly or if parents engage in compensatory behaviour
whereby parents of inherently lower ability children or children who have experienced negative
shocks have a higher level of participation in their child’s schooling. Ex ante, it is difficult to
determine the direction of the bias due to competing hypotheses, rendering it largely an empirical
question. In the section that follows, I discuss the econometric method I use to address these forms
of bias.
2.4.1 Full Information Maximum Likelihood
The full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) method estimates the approximations to the
decision rules jointly with the child skill production functions as a system of equations allowing
for correlation in the error terms across equations with the explicit inclusion of permanent and
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity in the parental input and child skill equations and uses
exclusion restrictions generated by the theoretical model to identify parameters of interest. By
directly including the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the input decisions, the method resolves
the problem of selection due to omitted variables stemming from a correlation between parental
inputs and unobserved heterogeneity present in the error term of the child skill production function.
Since the approximations to the parents’ decision rules depend on the previous input choices made,
the method allows for both the direct and indirect effect of input decisions to be quantified through
the dynamic evolution of input decisions and skill formation.12
12This would not have been possible in a linear instrumental variable framework as the first-stages are estimated




In order to account for the possibility that there are unobserved mother/child characteristics
that can both influence parental input decisions as well as child skill formation, I employ the dis-
crete factor random effects methodology (Heckman and Singer (1984); Mroz and Guilkey (1992);
Mroz (1999)) and assume that there are a continuum of family types which are categorized into m
discrete types, one of which the mother draws in period 0 as shown in in figure 2.1. Additionally,
I approximate the distribution of time-varying shocks by again assuming a continuum that can be
categorized into q discrete types which the mother draws each period, also shown in figure 2.1.
Since the model includes a constant, I require a normalization in order to recover the mass points
and probability weights. I normalize the first mass point to be equal to 0, and since the sum of the
weights of each type must equal 1, I estimate (m−1) and (q−1) probability weights for permanent
and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, respectively. The unobserved heterogeneity parame-
ters: µm and νqt and their corresponding probability weights ηm, and ωq are estimated along with
the parameter vector by full information maximum likelihood. Instead of making the usual distri-
bution assumption of multi-variate normality of the unobserved heterogeneity parameters, I do not
impose a distributional assumption and instead use a discrete factor random effects specification
which estimates the mass points (types) and the probability of each type using a step function. The
decision not to impose normality on the unobserved heterogeneity parameters is a deliberate one
as using Monte Carlo Simulations, Mroz (1999) showed that the method employed here has been
shown to perform as well as maximum likelihood estimators in terms of precision and bias when
the true model is jointly normal and normality is assumed. Additionally, the method here has been
shown to be more robust to violations of the normality assumption. I use a non-linear specifica-
tion for unobserved heterogeneity, where mass points are estimated for each interval along with a
common set of probabilities.
Attrition and Initial Conditions
Individuals may attrit from the sample naturally as well as if they change schools during the
period, since I do not model the decision to change schools. I account for this potential non-
random attrition by modeling attrition as a function of the outcomes and behaviours observed in the
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period prior to individuals attriting from the sample, exclusion restrictions, as well as observable
characteristics and permanent and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. I estimate the attrition
equation jointly with the other outcome equations where Mist+1 = 1 if an individual is not present
in period t+ 1.
Since input choices and skills formation are dynamic and since I do not observe prior inputs
or skills in the initial period, and by construction, mother/child unobserved heterogeneity affects
all skills, input and labour force participation decisions in all periods, I need to specify an initial
conditions equation for all maternal decisions as well as for the child’s cognitive and non-cognitive
production functions to recover the correct distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity and deal
with the presence of lagged endogenous input and skill variables in the input decisions and skills
production functions. Here, the initial conditions equations are estimated in reduced form and are
identified using variables that affect initial input and skills but conditional on these, do not have
an independent effect on subsequent inputs and skills. For my exclusion restrictions, denoted by
the vector Zis0, I use the child’s birth weight, the child’s birth order, the number of older siblings,
whether the mother was married at the time of birth, the mother’s age at first birth and the mother’s
age at first birth squared. I present summary statistics of these variables in Appendix Table F.2.6. I




As noted before, the child skill outcomes and the parental input decisions depend on endoge-
nous explanatory variables hence it is important to discuss whether the coefficients of interest are
identified, the sources of identification, and the threats to identification. First, as mentioned pre-
viously, direct inclusion of the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the input decisions and skill
13The initial condition for the maternal fertility decision is the number of siblings at period 1. Subsequent per period
decisions are estimated as a multinomial logit model where k = 1 refers to keeping the number of siblings the same,
k = 2 refers to decreasing the number of siblings and k = 3 refers to increasing the number of siblings.
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production functions resolves the problem of selection stemming from the omission of these vari-
ables in these equations. Similarly, the specification of initial conditions equations helps to assist in
the identification of the parameters of lagged endogenous variables. Second, the theoretical model
in Section 2.3 implies natural exclusion restrictions that I use to help identify the parameters of
interest. For instance, child care subsidies affect input decisions through affecting the budget con-
straint of the household, but do not directly affect child skill formation and are assumed to be
uncorrelated with the error term in the child skill equations. Additionally, state welfare and taxa-
tion rules, other sources of income, as well as transfers and credits affect the budget constraint of
the mother and thus her input decisions but do not directly affect child skill formation. Third, due
to the dynamic nature of input decisions, current input decisions depend on prior input decisions
and though recursive substitution, the entire history of prior inputs, and by extension the entire his-
tory of exogenous variables. As such, the entire history of exogenous variables serve as exclusion
restrictions since they will affect the trajectory of maternal behavioural choices and thus contem-
poraneous maternal inputs due to the dynamic nature of inputs, but do not directly affect child skill
production. I use the hours of school-related leave, the average unemployment insurance tax, the
number of children per child care center, the maximum weekly benefit, the average child support
distributions, the per cent employed in services, the average subsidized child care expenditure and
the average tax liability for a family earning $25,000. I present summary statistics of the variables
used to generate the exclusion restrictions in Table F.2.7 and discuss them further in section B.2.1
of the appendix. Last, non-linearities present in the maternal employment and fertility equations
and assumptions on the functional forms of the idiosyncratic portion of the error terms in the input
and skills equations assist in identification.
One concern with the use of state-level variables as exclusion restrictions is that there may be
unobserved state characteristics captured in the error term of the child skill production functions
that could be correlated with the exclusion restrictions. Such a correlation would violate the exo-
geneity condition, rendering the exclusion restrictions invalid and leading to inconsistent parameter
estimates. In the case of the exogeneity condition, first, I argue that states are unlikely to differ
systematically in average child ability and that this form of bias is especially unlikely to hold when
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conditioning on key variables such as race, maternal education and household income. Second, I
provide empirical evidence that the exogeneity condition is likely to be met by performing a test of
overidenitfying restrictions and verifying that the exclusion restrictions pass the test. Additionally,
I present further evidence that these forms of endogneiety are unlikely to substantially affect esti-
mates by checking robustness of estimates to the inclusion of school-level permanent unobserved
heterogeneity in section 2.5.3.
In order to account for the potential endogeneity of the input decisions with respect to the
human capital development and non-cognitive development of the child, I estimate the system of
equations jointly with the child cognitive and non-cognitive production functions, in addition to
the initial conditions and attrition equations. The system of equations is specified below:
ln
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The error term in each equation can be decomposed into three components: permanent un-
observed heterogeneity of the mother/child, the µs, time-varying unobserved heterogeneity of the
mother/child, the νs as well as decision-specific shocks, the εs. Shocks are superscripted by alterna-
tives to account for unobserved heterogeneity having differing effects on child skill formation and
maternal input decisions. The error terms are correlated across equations through permanent char-
acteristics of the mother/child, and time-varying unobserved characteristics of the mother/child,
the νs, and across time through permanent unobserved characteristics of the mother/child, the µs.
Whereas I assume the permanent unobserved heterogeneity is drawn in period 0 and fixed over
time, I assume νist is a time-varying shock that is drawn each period and affects all alternatives
and child skill formation. An example would be a health shock to the child that affects child skill
formation as well as the mother’s decision to work, fertility choices, and her home input and in-
volvement decisions. I assume νist is not serially correlated conditional on permanent unobserved
heterogeneity.14 Lastly, I assume εist contains an alternate or outcome specific random shock that is
uncorrelated across individuals and over time. I assume εist is distributed ∼ N(0, σ2) for continu-
ous equations and Type 1 Extreme Value for discrete equations, however, I do not make functional
form assumptions on the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms.15
Estimation
I jointly estimate the above system of equations using full information maximum likelihood.
The parameter vector θ is estimated jointly with the number of permanent unobserved types of
14I provided some indication that this is likely to hold by performing and rejecting an Arellano-Bond test of serial
correlation in the differenced error terms within a System Generalized Method of Moments framework.
15Using Monte Carlo Simulations, Mroz (1999) showed that the method employed here has been shown to perform
as well as maximum likelihood estimators in terms of precision and bias when the true model is jointly normal and
normality is assumed. Additionally, the method here has been shown to be more robust to violations of the normality
assumption.
49
mother/child and the probability weight for each type as well as the number of time-varying unob-
served heterogeneity types and their respective probability weights. The unconditional likelihood
function for a mother whose child i is in school s is given by the joint probability of observing the
cognitive and non-cognitive skills and the parental inputs:

































































































where ηm is the probability of a mother/child being type m and ωq is the probability of a type
q shock.
The likelihood for the entire sample is:
N∏
i=1
Lis(θ, µm, νqt, ηm, ωq) (2.22)
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Production Function Estimates
I present the results for the FIML specification in Column 2 in Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, for
reading, math and non-cognitive skills, respectively, including the unobserved heterogeneity terms
along with the baseline OLS results in Column 1 for comparison. I use 4 points of support for
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permanent unobserved heterogeneity and 3 points of support for time-varying unobserved het-
erogeneity with the mass points and probability weights presented in the table 2.4 below, where
Column 1 gives the probabilities for permanent unobserved heterogeneity types, Column 2 gives
the mass point of each permanent unobserved heterogeneity type, with the standard errors reported
in brackets, Column 3 gives the probabilities for the time-varying unobserved heterogeneity types,
and Column 4 gives the mass point of each time-varying unobserved heterogeneity type, with the
standard errors reported in brackets. Prior to comparing the OLS and FIML coefficients, I first
test whether there is a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the model as measured by
the value of the likelihood function from including the permanent and time-varying unobserved
heterogeneity terms by performing a likelihood ratio test. I outline the details of the test in Ap-
pendix section C.2.1 and discuss the conclusions here. Based on the results of the test, I find that
the model including permanent unobserved heterogeneity results in a better fit compared with the
model excluding unobserved heterogeneity. This finding further underscores the importance of
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity when identifying parameters of interest.
I find positive and statistically significant effects of a parent volunteering in school on math,
reading and non-cognitive skills of 0.04, 0.04, and 0.05 standard deviations, respectively. To get
a sense of the magnitude of these estimates, the effects are comparable to roughly 17%, 19%, and
64% of the direct effect of a mother having a bachelor’s degree or higher education as opposed
to a high school or less than high school education. The effect sizes in the FIML specification
where I correct for the endogeneity of parental involvement and other related input decisions are
approximately 52%, 44%, and 9% larger as compared with the OLS results for math, reading,
and non-cognitive skills, respectively. I find evidence that both permanent and time-varying unob-
served heterogeneity matter for the realization of math, reading and non-cognitive skills with all
terms statistically significant at the 1% level.
I find that attending a parent-teacher conference has a negative and statistically significant
effect on reading skills in the baseline OLS specification of approximately 0.05 standard devia-
tions, however, I find that the effect becomes statistically insignificant when the endogeneity of
the decision is accounted for. Conversely, I find that attending a parent-teacher conference has a
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statistically insignificant effect on math skills in the baseline OLS specification, however, when the
endogeneity is accounted for I find a positive and statistically significant effect of 0.04 standard
deviations, though only at the 10% level, equivalent to approximately 19% of the effect of having
a mother with a bachelor’s or higher education as opposed to high school or less than high school.
These two results seem to suggest evidence of a negative selection into attending parent-teacher
conferences whereby parents of inherently lower skilled children are more likely to participate in
parent-teacher conferences, highlighting the importance of controlling for the effect of unobserved
characteristics when quantifying the effects of the parental involvement decisions. Last, I find a
diminished effect of attending parent-teacher conferences on non-cognitive skills when comparing
OLS and FIML estimates. Attending a parent teacher conference has a negative effect of of 0.07
standard deviations under OLS compared with 0.06 standard deviations under FIML, representing
a decrease in the effect of 14%. While the recovered estimates of the effects of parental involve-
ment are largely intuitive, the negative effect of attending a parent-teacher conference on a child’s
non-cognitive skills is puzzling. One possible way in which attending a parent-teacher confer-
ence could lead to negative effects on a child’s non-cognitive skills is if parents react negatively
to the teacher’s report of their child’s non-cognitive skills, thus causing them to decline further.
One way to test this would be to evaluate the effect of attending a parent-teacher conference on
non-cognitive inputs, however, a lack of data on non-cognitive inputs precludes this.
I find a positive direct effect of home inputs on math and reading scores of 0.04 and 0.04
standard deviations, corresponding to roughly 17% and 17%, of the direct effect of the mother
having a bachelors or higher relative to high school or less than high school educational attainment,
respectively. I, however, do not find a direct effect of home inputs on non-cognitive skills. This
lack of an effect could be due to the definition of home inputs being skewed towards educational
inputs, largely due to an inconsistency in the report of non-cognitive inputs across waves. In their
paper, Fiorini and Keane (2014) consider a broader measure of home inputs that includes measures
of non-cognitive inputs such as warmth and discipline and find that these constructs affect their
measures of non-cognitive skills.
I do not find evidence to suggest that maternal employment has a direct effect on child skill
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accumulation once the endogeneity of the maternal input decision is accounted for. The number of
siblings has a negative effect on both math and reading skills possibly due to parental time dilution.
By contrast, the number of siblings has a positive effect on non-cognitive skills, potentially due to
increases in inter-personal skills gained through interacting with siblings.




Lag Reading Score 0.6202∗∗∗ (0.0067) 0.5090∗∗∗ (0.0089)
Lag Non-Cognitive Score 0.1394∗∗∗ (0.0062) 0.0655∗∗∗ (0.0069)
Mother Not Employed −0.0243∗ (0.0125) −0.0158 (0.0138)
Volunteering 0.0294∗∗ (0.0119) 0.0423∗∗∗ (0.0144)
Conference −0.0475∗∗ (0.0213) −0.0144 (0.0230)
Home Inputs 0.0546∗∗∗ (0.0062) 0.0421∗∗∗ (0.0114)
No. of Siblings −0.0336∗∗∗ (0.0053) −0.0335∗∗∗ (0.0061)
Bachelors or Higher 0.1910∗∗∗ (0.0173) 0.2470∗∗∗ (0.0196)
Mother/Child Type 1 1.1219∗∗∗ (0.0843)
Mother/Child Type 2 0.8281∗∗∗ (0.0574)
Mother/Child Type 3 0.8737∗∗∗ (0.0950)
Time-Varying Type 1 1.8321∗∗∗ (0.0853)
Time-Varying Type 2 −0.9884∗∗∗ (0.0825)
Observations 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the
restricted-use dataset. Standard errors are in parentheses. The full set of controls have
been suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are lagged reading and non-cognitive
skills, child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s education status, annual
household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at home,
year dummies and missing data indicators. * refers to statistical significance at the 10%
level, ** refers to statistical significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance
at the 1% level.
These effects may seem relatively small in magnitude, but they are largely consistent with effect
sizes observed when measuring the effect of similar inputs in much of the literature, particularly at
this stage of a child’s life. For instance Del Bono (2016) finds that a 1 standard deviation increase
in education inputs, a construct similar to home inputs, leads to a 0.04 standard deviation increase
in verbal skills when the child is aged 7. Additionally, it is important to note that the effect sizes of
other characteristics such as maternal education, race, and household income are relatively small
in magnitude. Looking at the initial conditions in Appendix tables F.2.15 to F.2.17, it becomes
apparent why the effect sizes are relatively small. Here we see large and statistically significant
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Lag Math Score 0.6938∗∗∗ (0.0078) 0.5825∗∗∗ (0.0100)
Lag Non-Cognitive Score 0.1336∗∗∗ (0.0064) 0.0625∗∗∗ (0.0069)
Mother Not Employed −0.0220∗ (0.0128) −0.0215 (0.0139)
Volunteering 0.0257∗∗ (0.0120) 0.0390∗∗∗ (0.0143)
Conference −0.0040 (0.0217) 0.0407∗ (0.0240)
Home Inputs 0.0484∗∗∗ (0.0064) 0.0347∗∗∗ (0.0116)
No. of Siblings −0.0192∗∗∗ (0.0052) −0.0138∗∗ (0.0060)
Bachelors or Higher 0.1579∗∗∗ (0.0179) 0.2093∗∗∗ (0.0202)
Mother/Child Type 1 1.1081∗∗∗ (0.0737)
Mother/Child Type 2 0.7714∗∗∗ (0.0530)
Mother/Child Type 3 0.8380∗∗∗ (0.0909)
Time-Varying Type 1 2.0434∗∗∗ (0.1158)
Time-Varying Type 2 −0.9642∗∗∗ (0.0997)
Observations 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the
restricted-use dataset. Standard errors are in parentheses. The full set of controls have
been suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are lagged math and non-cognitive
skills, child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s education status, annual
household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at home,
year dummies and missing data indicators. * refers to statistical significance at the 10%
level, ** refers to statistical significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance
at the 1% level.
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Lag Reading Score 0.0802∗∗∗ (0.0047) 0.0397∗∗∗ (0.0067)
Lag Non-Cognitive Score 0.5228∗∗∗ (0.0063) 0.5027∗∗∗ (0.0074)
Mother Not Employed 0.0041 (0.0118) 0.0062 (0.0116)
Volunteering 0.0486∗∗∗ (0.0115) 0.0531∗∗∗ (0.0118)
Conference −0.0719∗∗∗ (0.0206) −0.0647∗∗∗ (0.0201)
Home Inputs 0.0150∗∗ (0.0059) 0.0085 (0.0079)
No. of Siblings 0.0225∗∗∗ (0.0049) 0.0218∗∗∗ (0.0049)
Bachelors or Higher 0.0613∗∗∗ (0.0164) 0.0833∗∗∗ (0.0169)
Mother/Child Type 1 0.3480∗∗∗ (0.0373)
Mother/Child Type 2 0.2298∗∗∗ (0.0283)
Mother/Child Type 3 0.2199∗∗∗ (0.0455)
Time-Varying Type 1 0.3286∗∗∗ (0.0480)
Time-Varying Type 2 −0.2757∗∗∗ (0.0390)
Observations 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the
restricted-use dataset. Standard errors are in parentheses. The full set of controls have
been suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls are lagged reading and non-cognitive
skills, child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s education status, annual
household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at home,
year dummies and missing data indicators. * refers to statistical significance at the 10%
level, ** refers to statistical significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance
at the 1% level.
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effects of race and maternal education on initial math and reading skills. This suggests that after
controlling for the effect of this initial skill indirectly through the inclusions of the lagged score,
the effects of parental involvement and other inputs are marginal effects and thus relatively small.
Table 2.4: Mass Points and Probabilities-Baseline Model
Mother/Child Time-Varying
Type Probability Mass Point Probability Mass Point
1 0.1771 0.0000 0.8856 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
2 0.1991 0.1169 0.0188 −3.8529
(0.1698) (0.1090)




Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
2.5.2 Input Decisions
Appendix Tables F.2.8-F.2.13 show the approximation to the decision rules for the parental
involvement decisions-volunteering at school and attending a parent-teacher conference, home in-
puts, maternal non-employment, as well as the decisions to increase siblings and decrease siblings,
respectively. Column 1 in each specification gives baseline OLS result and Column 2 gives the
results accounting for individual level heterogeneity by including individual level permanent and
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. Since the main variable of interest is parental involve-
ment, I discuss the determinants of the input decisions in detail below. I also briefly discuss some
of the dynamics of the input decisions to show evidence of the importance of the dynamic inter-
dependence of inputs over time.
The main identified determinants of volunteering at school mirror some of what has been found
in the previous literature and are largely consistent with national trends. Parents are more likely
to volunteer if their child has higher prior cognitive and non-cognitive skills. This could be due to
children, or teachers of children, with higher cognitive or non-cognitive skills being more likely to
ask their parents to volunteer, or a lower associated cost and/or higher utility associated with volun-
teering if the child is higher-achieving. A higher level of maternal education and a higher income
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status are both associated with a higher probability of volunteering, possibly due to more educated
or wealthier mothers facing fewer barriers to participation and/or heterogeneous preferences for
child skill along these same dimensions as captured by the αs in the theoretical model in Section
2.3. Black mothers, Hispanic mothers, mothers from other races, and non-English speaking house-
holds are all associated with a lower probability of volunteering which may point to heterogeneous
barriers and/or preferences by race or language (Aronson (1996)) and/or a cultural reluctance to
interfere in what is viewed as the domain of teachers (Lareau (2000)). Having a mother who was
not employed in the prior period has a positive effect on the volunteering decision suggesting that
binding time constraints may be a key factor affecting volunteering. Surprisingly, the number of
children in the prior period does not seem to affect the probability of volunteering at school despite
the potential for there to be binding time constraints. Parents are also less likely to volunteer in later
grades, potentially due to the probability of them being more likely to be employed in later grades,
and thus being more time constrained. I find support for this hypothesis by analyzing the maternal
non-employment decision in Appendix table F.2.11, which shows some evidence that mothers are
less likely to not be employed in later grades. I find evidence that the school-related leave poli-
cies, the child tax credit, and state-level expenditure on subsidized child care all positively affect
the probability of volunteering. I find that unobserved heterogeneity matters for the volunteering
decision with mother/child type 3 and time-varying type 2 both statistically significant.
The determinants of attending a parent-teacher conference differ substantially from those of
the decision to volunteer, most notably in the effect of the child’s prior skill level. In contrast to
volunteering, having a child with lower prior cognitive and non-cognitive skills is associated with
an increase in the probability of attending a parent-teacher conference. This finding supports the
presence of negative selection inherent in the parent-teacher conference decision whereby parents
of lower skilled children are more likely to attend parent-teacher conferences leading to a down-
ward bias in the effect. I also find evidence of some racial differences compared with volunteering
at school with black parents more likely to attend a parent-teacher conference. Similar to volun-
teering at school, I find that parents are less likely to attend a parent-teacher conference in later
grades, perhaps for the same reason explained previously. I find evidence that the school-related
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leave policies and the child tax credit affects the probability of attending a parent-teacher confer-
ence, in addition to the state level expenditure on subsidized child care. With the exception of
Time-Varying Shock Type 1, there is little other evidence to suggest that unobserved heterogeneity
matters for the decision to attend a parent-teacher conference.
The difference in participation by child’s prior skill levels seems to suggest that parents partic-
ipate in different forms of involvement depending on where their children lie in the skills distribu-
tion and/or that teachers encourage parents to participate in different forms of activities depending
on where their children lie in the skills distribution. The reason for this difference could be that
attending a parent-teacher conference may be viewed as a remedial, hence parents of lower skilled
children being more likely to attend, whereas volunteering at school may be viewed as a more
general form of involvement.
The determinants of home inputs have been explored previously in the economics literature
(See for example Del Boca (2014) and Fiorini and Keane (2014)). The salient determinants iden-
tified from the home input decisions are largely consistent with the prior literature. Parents of
children with higher prior reading scores have a higher level of home inputs, however, I do not
find an effect for prior non-cognitive skills. As mentioned previously, this lack of an effect could
be due to the definition of home inputs being skewed towards educational inputs, largely due to an
inconsistency in the report of non-cognitive inputs across waves. Since we did not find an effect of
home inputs on non-cognitive skills (See table 2.3), then we would not necessarily expect parents
to adjust these inputs in response to prior realizations of non-cognitive test scores. Parents invest
a higher level of home inputs if the child is a girl, relative to a boy, consistent with the gender
differences highlighted by Fiorini and Keane (2014) who found that parents spend more time in
educational activities with girls whilst boys spend more time on media activities. More educated
mothers have a higher level of home inputs, this could be due to differences in the cost of home
inputs, differences in preferences for child quality and/or differences in the productivity of home
inputs by maternal education status. Interestingly single parents and households who do not speak
English as the primary language have a higher level of home inputs, perhaps due to them having a
lower propensity to be employed (See F.2.11). The school-related leave policy has a direct effect
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on home inputs, potentially through conveying the importance of parents as active agents in their
child’s education process, leading to an increase in home inputs. I find evidence that permanent
unobserved heterogeneity matters for home inputs with both mother/child types 1 and 2 affecting
the level of home inputs, but I do not find effects for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity.
The determinants of the maternal employment and fertility decisions, largely enter with the
expected signs. One thing to note, is the large degree of persistence inherent in employment states
in that if an individual is not employed in period t − 1, there is a strong probability that that
individual would not be employed in period t. With the exception of a statistically significant
effect of mother/child unobserved heterogeneity type 3 in the maternal employment decision, I do
not find evidence so suggest that unobserved heterogeneity matters for the maternal employment
and fertility decisions.
I find support for various forms of dynamic inter-dependence of input decisions. For instance,
having a mother who is not employed in the previous period has positive effects on contempo-
raneous volunteering and home input decisions. This inter-temporal effect could be due to the
persistence in unemployment states cited previously in that if the mother is not employed in the
previous period she is unlikely to be employed in the current period and thus have more time avail-
able for home inputs and volunteering at school. Interestingly, I find evidence that the lagged level
of home inputs affects volunteering at school, and to a lesser extent home inputs, whereby a 1 stan-
dard deviation increase in home inputs leads to a 0.08 increase in the probability of volunteering
at school, roughly 16% of the effect of having a mother with a bachelors or higher relative to high
school or less education. This could be due to parents who spend more time with their children at
home being more aware of opportunities to volunteer at school. I also find evidence of an indirect
effect of volunteering, and to a lesser extent, attending a parent-teacher conference, on parental
on home inputs whereby a 1 standard deviation increase in lagged volunteering is associated with
a 0.07 standard deviation increase in contemporaneous home inputs. The effect of lagged volun-
teering on home inputs is roughly 39% of direct effect of having a mother with a bachelor’s or
higher relative to having a mother with high school or less educational attainment. This effect
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has previously been documented in the literature, most notably by (Wherry (2004)), who hypoth-
esizes that through interacting with teachers, parents are better able to establish an environment
more conducive to learning at home, leading to an increase in the quantity and quality of home
inputs and subsequently child skill production. Evidence of these dynamic effects underscores
the importance of modeling related input decisions in quantifying the total impact of the parental
involvement decision and in quantifying the effect of various policy simulations on life-cycle skill
accumulation.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
School Correlated Random Effects
In order to account for the possibility that there are unobserved characteristics at the school
(or state) level that can both influence parental input decisions and child skill formation, I in-
clude school-level permanent unobserved heterogeneity parameters in my input decisions and skill
production functions and rely on variation within a school over time to identify my parameters
of interest. In addition to accounting for unobserved school inputs, the inclusion of school-level
permanent unobserved heterogeneity also accounts for potential unobserved state-level inputs as
students within a school are necessarily nested within the same state. I employ the correlated ran-
dom effects method outlined in section D.2.1 in table 2.5 below with the associated unobserved
heterogeneity types and their corresponding probability weights presented in table 2.6. The cor-
related random effects model assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity, in this case, the school-
level unobserved heterogeneity can be modeled as a function of the school level time-average of
the included regressors and includes these time-averages as regressors in the equations along with
their contemporaneous counterparts. We can compare this approach with a fixed effect model
where no restriction is placed on the relationship between the school-level unobserved heterogene-
ity and the regressors and instead of controlling for the school-level time-average of the included
regressors, consistent estimates are recovered after demeaning the terms through subtracting the
corresponding school-level time-average. Incidentally, though the correlated random effects and
fixed effects deal with the endogeneity problem in different ways, the parameters recovered on the
time-varying variables in the fixed effect and correlated random effect models will be the same.
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For the correlated random effects model, I estimate four points of support for the permanent un-
observed heterogeneity and three points of support for the time-varying unobserved heterogeneity
and present the mass points along with their associated probabilities in table 2.6 below. Similar
to the results without correlated random effects, I find that all types of unobserved heterogeneity
matter for skill formation across all skills with all types statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 2.5: Math, Reading and Non-Cognitive Skills-School Correlated Random Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Math Reading Non-Cognitive
Volunteer 0.0298∗ (0.0156) 0.0183 (0.0157) 0.0595∗∗∗ (0.0128)
Conference −0.0360 (0.0297) −0.0653∗∗ (0.0283) −0.0912∗∗∗ (0.0234)
Mother/Child Type 1 −0.2912∗∗∗ (0.0478) −0.2619∗∗∗ (0.0494) −0.1528∗∗∗ (0.0388)
Mother/Child Type 2 −1.0410∗∗∗ (0.0824) −1.0438∗∗∗ (0.0907) −0.3363∗∗∗ (0.0381)
Mother/Child Type 3 −0.3159∗∗∗ (0.0298) −0.2693∗∗∗ (0.0372) −0.1045∗∗∗ (0.0252)
Time-Varying Type 1 0.9926∗∗∗ (0.0970) 1.0221∗∗∗ (0.0805) 0.2918∗∗∗ (0.0385)
Time-Varying Type 2 3.0513∗∗∗ (0.1818) 2.8696∗∗∗ (0.1403) 0.6318∗∗∗ (0.0627)
Observations 21750 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The full set of controls have been suppressed for brevity. The full set of
controls are lagged math, reading, and non-cognitive skills, child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared,
mother’s education status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken
at home, year dummies and missing data indicators. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers
to statistical significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 2.6: Mass Points and Probabilities-School Correlated Random Effects
Mother/Child Time-Varying
Type Probability Mass Point Probability Mass Point
1 0.1851 0.0000 0.0930 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
2 0.0916 −0.7032 0.8891 2.2577
(0.1333) (0.2016)




Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
With the exception of the effect on reading skills, the results on volunteering are largely con-
sistent with the model that does not account for school-level unobserved heterogeneity, however,
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the results on attending parent-teacher conferences show some inconsistencies. In the context of
a likely relatively low degree of variation in attending parent teacher conferences within a school
and over time (See Table F.2.4), caution should be used in interpreting these coefficients.
2.5.4 Heterogeneity Analysis
In this section, I explore whether the different measures of parental involvement have differ-
ent effects across sub-groups of interest. I focus on heterogenous effects by (prior) skill level to
compare my results to the literature on dynamic complementarities (Cunha and Heckman (2008)).
I repeat the analysis by including an interaction term between the measures of parental involve-
ment and lagged cognitive and non-cognitive skills to determine whether parental involvement has
differential effects based on prior child achievement. I present the results in Table 2.7 and the
mass points for the unobserved heterogeneity types and their associated probabilities in table 2.8
below. For ease of interpretation, I de-mean the cognitive and non-cognitive skills in the interac-
tion terms. I find evidence that volunteering at school has a greater effect for children with lower
prior reading and math skills but do not find evidence that parental involvement has differential
effects based on the child’s prior non-cognitive skills. I also find less negative effects of attending
parent-teacher conferences on non-cognitive skills, but only for children towards the upper end
of the non-cognitive skills distribution. I estimate four points of support for the permanent un-
observed heterogeneity and three points of support for the time-varying unobserved heterogeneity
and present the mass points along with their associated probabilities in table 2.8. Similar to the
results without the inclusion of the interaction terms, I find that both permanent and time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity matter with all types statistically significant at the 1% level for math,
reading and non-cognitive skills. Given that I find substantial heterogeneity, going forward, I use
the results accounting for heterogeneity as my main results.
2.5.5 Life-Cycle Effects
Since the measures of parental involvement appear in several places throughout the model,
namely directly as inputs in the skill equations and indirectly as lags in the contemporaneous input
decisions, it is difficult to quantify the effects of parental involvement over the life-cycle of the
child. To get a sense of the life-cycle effect of parental involvement, I simulate the life-cycle
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Lag Score 0.7110∗∗∗ (0.0284) 0.5742∗∗∗ (0.0293) 0.3677∗∗∗ (0.0464)
Volunteer 0.1212∗∗∗ (0.0178) 0.1198∗∗∗ (0.0180) 0.0613∗∗∗ (0.0118)
Volunteer*Lag Score −0.0638∗∗∗ (0.0060) −0.0556∗∗∗ (0.0064) 0.0125 (0.0117)
Conference 0.0572∗ (0.0310) −0.0210 (0.0317) −0.0699∗∗∗ (0.0212)
Conference*Lag Score −0.0121 (0.0117) 0.0143 (0.0121) 0.0598∗∗∗ (0.0224)
Mother/Child Type 1 −0.2846∗∗∗ (0.0420) −0.2572∗∗∗ (0.0438) −0.1388∗∗∗ (0.0373)
Mother/Child Type 2 −0.3235∗∗∗ (0.0307) −0.2782∗∗∗ (0.0377) −0.1074∗∗∗ (0.0248)
Mother/Child Type 3 −1.0593∗∗∗ (0.0764) −1.0680∗∗∗ (0.0877) −0.3394∗∗∗ (0.0375)
Time-Varying Type 1 3.1435∗∗∗ (0.1561) 2.9405∗∗∗ (0.1239) 0.6293∗∗∗ (0.0617)
Time-Varying Type 2 1.0389∗∗∗ (0.0854) 1.0505∗∗∗ (0.0703) 0.2801∗∗∗ (0.0392)
Observations 21750 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. The full set of controls have been suppressed for brevity. The full set of controls
are lagged math, reading, and non-cognitive skills, child gender, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s ed-
ucation status, annual household income (000’s), child race, family structure, primary language spoken at home,
year dummies and missing data indicators. * refers to statistical significance at the 10% level, ** refers to statistical
significance at the 5% level, *** refers to statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 2.8: Mass Points and Probabilities-Heterogeneity Analysis
Mother/Child Time-Varying
Type Probability Mass Point Probability Mass Point
1 0.1920 0.0000 0.0827 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
2 0.0994 −0.6583 0.0180 −1.5274
(0.1275) (0.1833)




Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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change of having a parent who volunteers at school each period, and compare the trajectories
of cognitive and non-cognitive skill accumulation with that of a parent who never volunteers at
school. Similarly, I simulate the cognitive and non-cognitive trajectories of a parent who always
attends parent-teacher conferences and compare them with that of a parent who never attends
parent-teacher conferences. In addition to the direct effect of parental involvement on child skill
formation, the life-cycle effects take into account the dynamics of input decisions by allowing for
fertility, maternal employment and home inputs to change in response to the change in parental
involvement due to mechanisms discussed previously. I gave a cursory treatment to the simulation
procedure here, but discuss it more thoroughly in Appendix section E.2.1. I present the results
for volunteering in Table 2.9 and for attending a parent-teacher conference in Table 2.10. As can
be seen from Table 2.9, the life-cycle effects of volunteering at school are largely concentrated in
the accumulation of non-cognitive skills, particularly in grade 3, with similar patterns observed
for math and reading skills. By contrast, due to the negative effect of attending a parent teacher-
conference on non-cognitive skills, there are negative effects on non-cognitive skill accumulation
immediately and over time. The effect of parent-teacher conferences on the life-cycle accumulation
of math and reading skills is relatively small.
Table 2.9: Life-Cycle Effects of Volunteering vs Not Volunteering
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
Math 0.123 0.216 0.283
Reading 0.121 0.195 0.239
Non-Cognitive 0.061 0.088 0.102
Observations 8550 7500 5600
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the re-
quirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
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Table 2.10: Life-Cycle Effects of Attending a Parent-Teacher Conference vs Not Attending a
Parent-Teacher Conference
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
Math 0.048 0.072 0.085
Reading −0.032 −0.061 −0.083
Non-Cognitive −0.075 −0.107 −0.121
Observations 8550 7500 5600
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the re-
quirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
2.6 Policy Simulations
Since a key question of interest is the effect of these state-school related leave policies on stu-
dent outcomes, in this section I use the estimates obtained from the full information maximum
likelihood estimator in the preferred model to evaluate the effects of these policies. The poli-
cies have been shown to affect the volunteering, conference and home inputs decisions directly
(See tables F.2.8 to F.2.10), and subsequently these inputs have been show to affect cognitive and
non-cognitive outcomes (See tables 2.1 to 2.3). Although, the policies do not affect the maternal
employment, and fertility decisions directly (See tables F.2.11-F.2.13), there may be indirect ef-
fects on these input decisions both through the dynamic interdependence of inputs as well as the
dependence of contemporaneous employment and fertility decisions on lagged score realizations
which in turn depend on prior volunteering, conference and home input decisions. By accounting
for both the direct effect of the policies on the volunteering, conference and home input decisions,
in addition to the potential indirect effects on the employment and fertility decisions, I am able to
quantify both the direct and indirect mechanisms through which the policy can affect outcomes.
2.6.1 State School-Related Leave Policies
When surveyed about the reasons preventing parents from getting involved in their child’s
schooling as shown in figure 2.2, the primary reason given is “cannot get the time off from work”
(approximately 37 percent in Kindergarten and 32 percent in Grade 2), followed by “inconvenient
meeting time” (approximately 25 percent in Kindergarten and 22 percent in Grade 2), suggesting
binding time constraints are one of the primary reasons hindering parents’ ability to participate in
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school-based activities.16
Figure 2.2: Parental Reasons for Non-Participation
In response to this, some states have implemented a policy that allows parents time off from
their place of work to participate in their child’s schooling. The number of hours allowed off ranges
from 2 hours to 40 hours with the distribution presented in figure 2.3.
Section B.2.1 in the Appendix further discusses these policies. The primary effect of these
policies is through relaxing the time-constraints of parents, allowing them to increase their level of
parental involvement; though there may be additional effects through conveying the importance of
parents as active agents in their child’s schooling process, potentially altering how parents value
education, leading them to adjust their inputs. Despite the relatively widespread implementation
of the policy, the effects of the policy on student outcomes have not yet been formally quantified.
In the sections that follow, I examine the effect of the policy on a child’s math, reading and non-
cognitive skills and evaluate some of the potential mechanisms through which these policies can
affect outcomes.
16The question comes from the parent questionnaire in the ECLS-K and is asked in the Spring of Kindergarten
and the Spring of Grade 2 as follows: “This year have the following reasons made it harder for you to participate in
activities at your child’s school”?
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2.6.2 Policy Simulations
Using the estimated dynamic model in section 2.4, I can evaluate the long term effects of
increasing the number of hours parents are allowed off on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes.
These simulations will allow me not only to quantify the total effects of the policy simulation,
but also allow me to directly identify and quantify the mechanisms through which the policy is
affecting outcomes.
Prior to conducting policy simulations, it is important to check that the estimated model fits
the patterns observed in the data to ensure the baseline effects are comparable to what is observed
in the data and to give credence to the estimated parameters. Table 2.11 shows the observed and
simulated values for maternal input decisions and child skill formation for each wave of the data.
As can be seen from the table, the model fits the observed patterns in the data well, though to a
lesser extent in the final period, presumably due to the degree of non-random attrition occurring
between the last two waves (See Appendix Table F.2.14), where we see that parents who are less
likely to volunteer and attend a parent-teacher conference are all more likely to attrit. Additionally,
I find that there is substantial unobserved heterogeneity in the decision to attrit with all types
affecting the probability of attrition.
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Table 2.11: Actual and Simulated Model Fit
Variable
First Grade Second Grade Third Grade
Observed Simulated Observed Simulated Observed Simulated
Continuous
Math 3.37 3.22 4.77 4.46 5.76 5.29
(1.44) (1.14) (1.30) (1.26) (1.17) (1.35)
Reading 3.50 3.44 4.65 4.49 5.38 5.12
(1.43) (1.10) (1.15) (1.12) (1.03) (1.16)
Non-Cognitive 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.05
(0.98) (0.94) (0.98) (0.88) (0.97) (0.88)
Home Inputs -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.14
(0.95) (0.88) (0.92) (0.90) (0.89) (0.91)
Discrete
Volunteer 59.64 58.95 56.74 57.47 56.88 57.45
Conference 93.93 93.91 92.76 93.78 92.06 93.40
Mother Not Employed 32.27 32.14 29.07 29.26 26.32 26.68
Decrease Siblings 1.68 1.64 2.59 2.97 2.37 2.61
Increase Siblings 5.06 5.08 4.91 5.17 4.09 4.36
Observations 8550 8550 7500 7500 5600 5600
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset. Standard
deviations are reported in parentheses. Standard deviations on discrete variables are suppressed for brevity.
In this policy simulation, I evaluate the effect of changing the number of hours parents are al-
lowed off of their place of work to participate in their child’s school to the current maximum policy
in place of 40 hours, and examine the life-cycle effect of this change. As can be seen from the in-
put decisions in tables F.2.8-F.2.13 and the outcome equations in tables 2.1-2.3, altering this policy
will have a contemporaneous effect on outcomes as it alters the contemporaneous input decisions,
which have been shown to directly affect outcomes. Additionally, there will be a dynamic effect on
outcomes as lagged inputs and lagged outcomes affect contemporaneous input decisions which in
turn affect outcomes. In figure 2.4, I show the results of this simulation, comparing math, reading,
and non-cognitive skills in grades 1, 2 and 3, before and after the policy simulation where “old”
denotes the average test scores under the existing policy regime and “new” denotes the average test
scores under the proposed policy simulation.
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Simulating through the model after changing the number of hours of school-related leave fol-
lowing the procedure outlined in Appendix section E.2.1 gives us point estimates of the new test
scores and inputs. In order to get the corresponding standard errors on these points estimates to
determine whether they are statistically significant, I use a bootstrap procedure. I briefly outline
the procedure here and defer a more complete treatment to Appendix section E.2.1. The standard
errors are obtained using a parametric bootstrap procedure with 1000 draws. In general, parametric
bootstraps assume that the data come from a known distribution, in this case, a multi-variate normal
distribution, with unknown mean and variance, that are here estimated using the full information
maximum likelihood framework. Subsequent to recovering the mean and variance of the param-
eters, the bootstrap samples are constructed by parametrizing the assumed multi-variate normal
distribution using the estimated mean and variance matrix. For each iteration of the simulation,
new samples are drawn from this distribution, producing potentially different parameter estimates
with each iteration. Subsequent to running all iterations, the standard errors are computed from
the standard deviation of the estimates. Since all the estimates are statistically significant due to
very precisely estimated standard errors ranging from 0.00004 to 0.00046, I suppress the standard
errors and discuss the point estimates only.
In figure 2.4, I show the result of this simulation where sub-figure 2.4(a) shows the change in
math scores, sub-figure 2.4(b) shows the change in reading scores and sub-figure 2.4(c) shows the
change in non-cognitive scores. As can be seen from the graphs, the change in math and reading
scores is negligible across all grades, most less than half a percentage increase. However, looking at
graph 2.4(c), we see larger effects in the effect of the policy change on non-cognitive skills, though
only in grades 2 and 3, where the percentage changes are 3.28% and 4.96%, respectively. Having
identified the effect of the policy simulation on the outcomes of interest, I now turn to identifying
and quantifying the respective mechanisms through which the policy is affecting outcomes.
In figure 2.5, I show the effect of changing the policy on the three inputs that are directly af-
fected by the policy: the probability of volunteering, the probability of attending a parent-teacher
conference and the level of home inputs, where sub-figure 2.5(a) shows the effect on the proba-
bility of volunteering, sub-figure 2.5(b) shows the effect on attending a parent-teacher conference
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Figure 2.4: Three sub-figures showing average math, reading, and non-cognitive test scores before
and after increasing the number of hours of school-related leave to 40 in all years: (a) shows math
scores before and after the policy change; (b) shows reading scores before and after the policy
change; (b) shows non-cognitive scores before and after the policy change.
(a) Average math scores before and after the policy
change
(b) Average reading scores before and after the policy
change
(c) Average non-cognitive scores before and after the
policy change
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and sub-figure 2.5(c) shows the effect on the level of home inputs. As expected from analyzing the
determinants of these input decisions, the policy has effects across all 3 inputs. For volunteering,
the policy leads to a 3.7, 5.3, and 5.85 percentage point increase in grades 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
For attending a parent-teacher conference the corresponding effect sizes are a 2.7, 3.2 and 3.3 per-
centage point increase in grades 1, 2, and 3 respectively. We also see changes in the level of home
inputs of magnitude 0.06, 0.08 and 0.09 standard deviations in grades 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Though the home inputs do not directly affect non-cognitive skills, they still could indirectly affect
them through the dependence of volunteering at school on prior home inputs, and the subsequent
effect of volunteering at school on non-cognitive inputs. Despite the relatively large change in
inputs, this does not translate into substantial changes in the math and reading test scores due to
the relatively small effects of the inputs on these outcomes (See tables 2.1 and 2.2). Across all
inputs, the increases are larger in the later grades, corresponding with a larger effect of the policy
change on non-cognitive skills in these later grades. The larger increases in the inputs in the later
grades, likely comes through the dynamic inter-dependence of these input decisions both through
persistence as well as dynamic cross-effects. For instance, looking at the volunteering decision, we
see that lagged volunteering, attending a parent-teacher conference and home inputs all positively
and statistically significantly affect the probability of volunteering. Similarly, lagged volunteering,
lagged conference, and to a lesser extent, lagged home inputs all affect the probability of attend-
ing a parent-teacher conference. The larger effects of the policies on non-cognitive skills in later
grades could also be due to larger effects of volunteering in later grades as seen in table 2.9 and as
is discussed in section 2.5.5.
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Figure 2.5: Three sub-figures showing the per cent volunteer, attend a parent-teacher conference,
and average home inputs before and after increasing the number of hours of school-related leave
to 40 in all years: (a) shows the per cent volunteering before and after the policy change; (b) shows
the per cent attending a parent-teacher conference before and after the policy change; (c) shows
average home inputs before and after the policy change.
(a) Per cent volunteer before and after the policy
change
(b) Per cent attend parent-teacher conference before
and after the policy change
(c) Average home inputs before and after the policy
change
In figure 2.6, I show the effect of the policy on the per cent of mothers not employed, the per
cent of mothers that increase the number of siblings in the household and the per cent of mothers
that decrease the number of siblings in the household. Is it important to bear in mind, that these
inputs are not directly affected by the policy, so any changes in the inputs are coming though
the dynamic interdependence of these input decisions on prior inputs and outcomes. Sub-figure
2.6(a) shows the effect on the probability of maternal non-employment, sub-figure 2.6(b) shows
the effect on the proportion of mothers that decrease the number of siblings in the household and
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sub-figure 2.6(c) shows the effect on the proportion of mothers that increase the number of siblings
in the household. As can be seen from the figures, the effects of the policies on these inputs are
negligible with most changes being less than half a percentage point. The findings suggest that
the indirect effects of the policy are extremely small in magnitude and are thus unlikely to be an
important channel through which the policy impacts outcomes.
Figure 2.6: Three sub-figures showing the per cent not employed, decrease siblings, and increase
siblings before and after increasing the number of hours of school-related leave to 40 in all years:
(a) shows the per cent increase siblings before and after the policy change; (b) shows the per cent
decrease siblings before and after the policy change; (c) shows the per cent increase siblings before
and after the policy change.
(a) Per cent not employed before and after the policy
change
(b) Per cent decrease siblings before and after the pol-
icy change
(c) Per cent increase siblings before and after the pol-
icy change
In summary, I find that altering the number of hours of school-related leave leads to an non-
negligible increase in non-cognitive skills, primarily in the later grades. The primary mechanisms
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through which the policy is affecting outcomes seems to be through the direct effect of increas-
ing the probability of volunteering, attending a parent-teacher conference, and to a lesser extent,
increasing the level of inputs at home. I did not find substantial evidence of the policy affect-
ing outcomes through indirect channels as the probability of the mother not being employed, the
proportion of mothers that decrease siblings and the proportion of mothers that increased siblings
largely remained unchanged.
2.7 Conclusion
Parental involvement has been promoted as a key component of education policy to improve
child outcomes yet research on its causal effects is scarce. Much of the efforts to understand the
effects of parental involvement have been hampered by the inability to adequately address non-
random selection into parental involvement and account for the effects of related input decisions.
One way to address this would be to rely on an instrumental variables approach to generate plau-
sibly exogenous sources of variation, however a lack of good instruments has largely precluded
this. By exploiting access to a rich dataset and exogenous variation in unique state labour policies
aimed at increasing the level of parental involvement, as well as other state level policies, this
paper is able to address this shortcoming and provide evidence of the causal effects of parental
involvement.
Using an empirical model derived from economic theory, I find that volunteering at school
has positive and similar effects for math, reading and non-cognitive skills and attending a parent-
teacher conference has a weakly positive effect on math skills. When looking at the determinants
of attending parent-teacher conferences, I find differences in the types of parents that engage in
the two types of parental involvement with parents of children with lower prior cognitive and non-
cognitive skills more likely to attend parent-teacher conferences. This stands in stark contrast to
the finding that parents of children with higher prior cognitive and non-cognitive skills are more
likely to volunteer at school. The two results seem to suggest that parents engage in different
activities depending on their child’s achievement whether through self-selection or at the behest of
the child or teacher.
Using the estimated model, this paper provides the first evaluation of the effects of existing
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state-level policies that allow parents time off work to participate in their child’s schooling aimed
at addressing binding work commitments, the primary reason given for non-participation. Through
model simulation using the framework of my empirical model, I find that allowing the maximum
of 40 hours off leads to an increase in the accumulation of non-cognitive skills, particularly in the
later grades. By exploiting the richness of the model, I am able to identify the primary mechanisms
through which the policy operates as increases in the probability of the volunteering, increases in
the probability of attending a parent-teacher conference and to a lesser extent, increases in the level
of home inputs. I do not find much support for other indirect mechanisms such as changes in the
maternal employment or fertility decisions.
In the context of the current policy climate with fourteen states currently having the policy in
place and a further four states proposing bills to introduce this policy, and in the broader context
of policy makers searching for innovative ways to get parents involved in their child’s schooling,
my research can inform the current policy debate as well as future policy debates going forward.
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APPENDICES
A.1 Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1.1 Tables and Figures
Table A.1.1: Mean and Standard Deviation of Select Child, Mother and Household Characteristics
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
Child
Male 50.38 50.78 50.76
White 54.45 54.67 56.54
Black 9.44 8.71 8.57
Hispanic 23.15 23.94 22.05
Other 12.96 12.68 12.84
Age 7.12 8.14 9.10
(0.40) (0.41) (0.39)
Mother
High School or Less 31.60 30.95 29.53
Some College 30.64 30.16 30.68
Bachelor’s or Higher 37.67 38.52 39.72
Employed 67.75 70.93 73.68
Not Employed 32.25 29.07 26.32
Age 35.50 36.77 37.99
(6.17) (6.09) (6.05)
Household
Two parent 82.58 83.72 84.95
Single parent/Other 17.42 16.28 15.65
Household Income (000’s) 72.89 76.31 82.17
(55.92) (57.30) (57.76)
English 81.43 80.68 81.73
Non-English 18.57 19.32 18.18
Observations 8700 7500 5600
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements
of using the restricted-use dataset. Standard deviations for continuous
variables are reported in parentheses. Standard deviations on discrete
variables are suppressed for brevity.
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Table A.1.2: Annual Hours of School-Related Leave by State
State Annual Hours of Leave
California 40














Note: New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Michigan
currently have pending bills.
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Table A.1.3: Mean and Standard Deviation of Skills
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
Math Scores 3.37 4.77 5.76
(1.44) (1.30) (1.17)
Reading Scores 3.50 4.65 5.38
(1.43) (1.15) (1.03)
Non-Cognitive Scores 0.26 -0.34 -0.30
(0.96) (0.87) (0.86)
Approaches to Learning 0.06 0.06 0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
Self-Control 0.05 0.05 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Interpersonal Skills 0.05 0.06 0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Externalizing Behaviour 0.04 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Internalizing Behaviour 0.03 0.04 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Attentional Focus 0.05 0.06 0.08
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Inhibitory Control 0.05 0.06 0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Observations 8700 7500 5600
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the require-
ments of using the restricted-use dataset. Standard deviations are re-
ported in parentheses.
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Table A.1.4: Mean and Standard Deviation of Select Inputs
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
Volunteer 59.62 56.74 56.88
Conference 93.92 92.76 92.06
Back to School Night 87.14 85.73 88.53
School Event 84.77 84.27 85.46
PTA/PTO Meetings 44.68 44.67 45.46
Maternal Employment 67.75 70.93 73.68
Home Inputs -0.04 0.03 0.00
(0.97) (0.95) (0.97)
Frequency Child Reads
Never/Once or Twice a Week 21.79 18.14 18.79
Three to Six Times a Week 40.30 40.96 41.31
Everyday 37.91 40.90 39.90
Extra-Curricular Activities
Child Participates 73.30 77.94 79.20
Hours of TV Watched
Below Median Hours of TV 61.24 61.77 59.58
No. of Nights Eat Together
Zero to Three 13.56 12.92 13.34
Four to Five 27.13 25.23 25.86
Six to Seven 59.31 61.85 60.80
Observations 8700 7500 5600
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of
using the restricted-use dataset. Standard deviations for continuous variables
are reported in parentheses. Standard deviations on discrete variables are
suppressed for brevity.
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Table A.1.5: State-Level Characteristics
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
Expenditure per Pupil (000’s) 10702.71 10803.00 11125.27
(2854.82) (2932.43) (3072.52)
GDP per capita 45971.37 46165.81 46739.05
(7600.28) (7494.03) (7611.58)
State Unemployment Rate 8.11 7.37 6.39
(1.77) (1.62) (1.34)
Avg. Weekly Benefit 296.65 302.76 306.40
(52.95) (56.68) (60.19)
Max. No. of Weeks of Welfare Benefits 25.51 25.32 24.83
(1.98) (2.18) (3.12)
Avg. Unemployment Insurance Claims 5.71 5.19 4.07
(1.13) (1.10) (0.87)
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B.1.1 Test of Equivalence of Means
The equivalence of means test is used to determine whether the means of two variables are
close enough as to be considered equivalent, or stated differently, whether the difference between
the two means is statistically indistinguishable from 0. The two variables here are the mean test
scores for states that have the policy, µp and the mean test scores for states that do not have the
policy, µnp. I outline the test below.
1. I first formulate the null and alternative hypothesis for the difference in means using three
t-tests:
Test Null Alternative T-test
1 µnp − µp = 0 µnp − µp 6= 0 Two-tailed
2 µnp − µp ≥ 0 µnp − µp < 0 One-tailed
3 µnp − µp ≤ 0 µnp − µp > 0 One-tailed












where snp is the standard deviation of the test scores in states without the policy, tnp is the












2/(tnp − 1)] + [(s2p/tp)2/(tp − 1)]
Test Statistic:
t = [(x̄np − x̄p]/SE
where x̄np is the sample mean for test scores in states without the policy and x̄p is the sample
mean for test scores in states with the policy.
3. I then compare the test statistic with the respective t critical value from the t Distribution
corresponding to the degrees of freedom above and the chosen significance level.
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A.2 Appendix for Chapter 2
A.2.1 Construction of Variables of Interest
Construction of Latent Factor for Non-Cognitive Skills
I use polychoric (Kolenikov and Angeles, 2004)17 analysis to extract a latent factor for child
non-cognitive skills. I outline the procedure used to extract the unobservable latent factor from
the observed measures I have in my data below. There are assumed to be MAn measures for the
latent factor of child non-cognitive achievement. The measurement system for the factor can be








j for m = 1, ...,M
An
(23)
where the term on the left hand side of the equation represents measure m of the associated
latent factor, which is assumed to measure the underlying latent factor with some error. The co-
efficient on the latent factor αk,m1 is the associated factor loading term which reflects how much
the measure explains or ”loads on” the latent factor.18 ζk,misj is the error term in the measurement
equation and αk,m0 is a constant. The factor is identified under the assumption that all errors in the
measurement equation are orthogonal to the latent factor and across measures.
Item Response Theory Test Scores
The measure of cognitive skills is constructed using Item Response Theory (IRT) math and
reading scale scores. The main advantage of IRT scores over other measures of child cognitive
skills such as raw test scores is that IRT adjusts for the probability of a low-ability child guessing
a difficult question using the pattern of correct answers in combination with the difficulty of the
correctly-answered questions. As such, it is likely to reduce the measurement error inherent in
inferring ability from raw test scores. IRT scores also allow for comparability of scores across time
even when the instruments used to determine ability differ across time. For ease of interpretation,
the IRT math and reading scores are standardized relative to the Kindergarten test scores.19
17Polychoric analysis to combine is a tool used to extract latent factors from any combination of binary, categorical,
and continuous variables. Polychoric analysis assumes that ordinal and binary variables proxy for latent continuous
variables that measure the latent factor of interest with noise and extract a factor based on the degree of correlation
between the ordinal variables. The STATA routine, which estimates polychoric correlations, can be downloaded from
http://www.unc.edu/∼ skolenik/strata/.
18For instance if the researcher observes 7 measures of non-cognitive skills, then m=1,2,3,4,5,6,7 in equation 1.
19For a more complete discussion on the use of IRT test scores in the ECLS-K see ”User’s Manual for
the ECLS-K:2011 Kindergarten-Fourth Grade Data File and Electronic Codebook, Public Version” available at
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018032.pdf
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B.2.1 State-Level Labor Market Conditions and Policies
State School-Leave Related Laws
In addition to the federal mandate of parental involvement set out as part of the 2001 No Child
Left Behind Act, individual states have implemented legislation aimed at increasing the level of
parental involvement in schools. One such policy is the provision of school-related leave whereby
employed parents can take time off from their place of employment to participate in their child’s
schooling subject to employer verification and sufficient notice in advance. I exploit variation
across states in the number of hours parents are allowed to take off per year, ranging from 2 hours
in Hawaii to 40 hours in California. Whilst only two states provide paid leave, most states allow for
parents to substitute other forms of paid leave for school-related leave. States also vary by whether
the law applies to government employees or to all employees. Information on state school-related
leave laws was gathered from state employment legislation.
State Labor Market Conditions
I use variation across states and time in variables aimed at capturing the local labour market
conditions that define the environment in which the mother makes her labour force participation
decisions. Specifically, I include the state per cent employed in services that could convey infor-
mation about the demand for maternal labour. Information on state labour market conditions were
collected from the American Community Survey 1-year estimates.
State Unemployment Insurance
Each state provides unemployment insurance designed to assist workers who become invol-
untarily separated from their jobs. Payouts are made from the Federal Unemployment Insurance
Trust Fund, however, states have considerable discretion on how these payments are disbursed and
the length of time the benefits are available. I use variation across states and time in the maxi-
mum number of weeks individuals can claim insurance benefits and the average unemployment
insurance claim by adjusted gross income. Information on the length of unemployment insurance
benefits were obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor and information on unemployment
insurance claims were obtained from tax returns accessed through the Internal Revenue Service.
State Welfare Benefits
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program provides temporary financial
assistance for poor and vulnerable families. States have considerable discretion on how to imple-
ment the program. One dimension along which states have latitude is the weekly benefit for needy
families. I use variation across states and time in the maximum weekly welfare benefit. Informa-
tion on the maximum weekly benefit comes from Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database.
State Child-Care Subsidies
Under the Child Care Development Fund (CCDF), states provide financial assistance to qual-
ifying low-income families to allow them to be able to afford child care so they can participate
in the labour force or further their education. Since states have discretion over the implementa-
tion, there is substantial variation across states in the program along four main dimensions: the
maximum income in order to be eligible for subsidized child care, the average co-payment parents
incur when accessing subsidized child care, minimum work hours requirements, and reimburse-
ment amounts states pay to child-care providers. I use the state level expenditure on subsidized
child care per child under the age of 6. In order to capture potential supply side constraints, I also
consider the number of children per child care center. Information on state child care expenditures
comes from the Office of Child Care, a subdivision of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. Information on the number of child care centers comes from the American Community
Survey 1-year estimates.
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State Child Tax Credits
Under the Child Tax Credit scheme, individuals with custody of dependent children under the
age of 17 can get tax credits to defray the costs associated with raising children. The tax credit is
designed to help individuals in low to mid income brackets and is thus not available to individuals
above a certain income threshold. In 2010, the thresholds were $110,000 for married couples filing
a joint return, $55,000 for married couples filing separate returns, and for all others, $75,000. I use
state and time variation in the average child tax credit by adjusted gross income group claimed.
Information on tax credits comes from tax returns accessed through the Internal Revenue Service.
Tax Rates
There is variation across states and time in the tax incidence of individuals according to state
and federal tax rates that vary by income bracket, marital status, and the number of children in
the household. Tax rates can affect the budget constraint of households and can thus affect input
decisions. I use state and time variation in the average tax rates for families earning $25,000 filing
jointly with 2 children. Information for average tax rates are obtained from the TAXSIM program
housed at the National Bureau of Economic Research, which calculates federal and state income
tax liabilities from household survey data.
Child Support Payments
Under Federal Law, non-custodial parents of divorced children are required to pay child support
to the custodial parent for maintenance of the child until the child reaches the age of 18. Whilst
mother to father transfers are possible, the vast majority of transfers are from fathers to mothers.
There is substantial variation across states in how the rules are enforced in addition to the formulas
used to compute the amount to be paid which affects child support disbursements. I use variation
across state and time in the average child support payments per single female with children under
18. Child support payments can supplement maternal income of single women which may translate
into increased child inputs. Information on child support distributions per state were gathered from
the Office of Child Support Enforcement, a division of the Office of the Administration for Children
and Families.
85
C.2.1 Likelihood Ratio Test
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is a test to evaluate the goodness of fit between two nested
models. A more complex model, here the model with unobserved heterogeneity, is compared
with a simpler model, here the model without unobserved heterogeneity, to estimate whether the
more complex model fits the data better as evidenced by whether there is a statistically significant
difference in the improvement of the value of the likelihood function. The form of the test statistic






where Lc(θ̂) is the value of the likelihood for the more complex model and Ls(θ̂) is the value
of the likelihood for the simpler model. The test statistic has a chi-squared asymptotic distribution
with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters between the two
models. The test statistic is compared with the relevant critical value to determine whether the
difference is statistically significant. The variables used to construct the test statistic are outlined
in the table below:
Table C.2.1: Comparison of the Value of the Likelihood Function Between the Heterogeneity and
No Heterogeneity Models
Model Likelihood No. of Parameters
No Heterogeneity -205457 422
Heterogeneity -196992 517
The test statistic is χ2=16930. The corresponding critical chi squared value with 95 degrees
of freedom and a 99% significant level, χ20.01(95), is 129.973. Based on a comparison between
the test statistic and the respective critical value, it appears that there is a statistically significant





I model the school-level time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity using a correlated random
effects specification using the Mundlak (1978) device which models the school-level permanent
unobserved heterogeneity as a linear projection of the school time-average of the time-varying
characteristics. The benefit of this approach is that it conserves on the estimation of additional
parameters whilst accounting for the endogeneity of inputs with regards to school-level permanent
unobserved factors in a manner similar to a school fixed effect model.20 However, unlike a school
fixed effect model, under certain assumptions consistent estimates of the variables that do not vary
within a school can be recovered.21 I use the parental involvement equation to illustrate the method.
We can rewrite the original parental involvement equation including a school-level unobserved
heterogeneity term, λs, as follows, where I decompose Zist into it’s school time-varying and school
non time-varying components as Cst and Gs, respectively:22
ln
(P (Iist = 0)






























The school-level permanent unobserved heterogeneity is modeled as a linear projection of the
school level time-average of the time varying covariates in the parental involvement equation as






















where the school level time-average of time-varying variables is assumed to be orthogonal to rs
by construction as rs is assumed to be a true random effect. The school time-average of the time-
varying characteristics are then substituted directly into the parental involvement input decision:
ln
(P (Iist = 0)















































20In fact the parameters on the time-varying variables at the school level will be the same as the ones estimated in a
school fixed effect model (Mundlak, 1978).
21This is not possible in a fixed effect model as these time-invariant terms would be removed through differencing
or demeaning.
22I drop the i subscript from these variables as they are constant for individuals within the same school.
23I retain the time superscript on the lagged terms to minimize confusion with the notation.
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The coefficients of interest can be recovered by estimating the equation by ordinary least
squares. A Hausman test of zero correlation between the covariates and the school-level unob-
served heterogeneity is given by a joint test:
H0 : σ0 = σ1 = ... = σ6 = 0
Ha: At least one σ is non-zero
Under very strict exogeneity conditions, the coefficients on the school non time-varying




Subsequent to estimating the model using full information maximum likelihood, I use simulations
to quantify effect sizes of interest. I use the technique both to determine the long-term effects of
volunteering and attending a parent-teacher, as well as to determine the effects of the policy
simulation. The simulation procedure is outlined as follows:
1. I use the estimated coefficients, mass points and probability weights to simulate the model
to predict the set of input decisions for each individual in the sample: volunteering,
attending a parent-teacher conference, home inputs, maternal employment, and fertility
decisions. In order to generate an idiosyncratic error term, I followed the procedure below:
a. For discrete variables, I compared the predicted probabilities to a random draw from a
uniform distribution with endpoints zero and one. If the predicted probability was
greater than the random draw, I would assign a 1 to that variable and a 0 otherwise.
b. For continuous variables, I generated a draw from a uniform random distribution with
endpoints zero and 1, multiplied by the standard deviation of the continuous variable,
and added this random variable to the predicted values.
2. I then predicted the outcome equations: math skills, reading skills and non-cognitive skills
by replacing the actual input decisions with their predicted values based on step 1 above. I
followed the same procedure outlined above to generate an idiosyncratic error term and
added it to the predicted values.
3. The predicted input decisions and outcome equations estimated in steps 1 and 2 above, are
then used as the next period’s lags.
a. I update the number of siblings going into period t+ 1 by adjusting the number of
siblings entering period t by the respective maternal fertility decision based on whether
it is predicted that she increases, decreases or keeps the number of siblings the same.
4. The process is repeated for each period until the terminal period of data.
Parametric Bootstrapped Standard Errors
The procedure above gives the point estimates of the effect sizes of interest, in order to get the
corresponding standard errors for these estimates, I use a parametric bootstrap procedure. The
parametric bootstrap procedure is outlined below:
1. I assume that the entire set of estimated coefficients, mass points, and probability weights
follow a multivariate normal distribution with mean corresponding to the point estimates of
the parameters and the covariance matrix corresponding the estimated covariance matrix for
the set of parameters.
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2. I then draw a set of normally distributed random variables from this distribution and perturb
each estimated coefficient using this random variable.
3. I simulate through the model using the procedure outlined in section E.2.1 using the
perturbed coefficients to get predicted variables for my parameters of interest.
4. I repeat the process 1000 times and save the estimated coefficients.
5. I construct the standard deviation based on the 1000 estimated coefficients.
6. I construct the standard errors from the standard deviation.
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F.2.1 Tables
Table F.2.1: Statistics for Attrition over the Waves for the Full Sample
Measure
Wave
Kgn. Fall Kgn. Spring Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
Number 18,200 17,800 16,000 14,800 14,000
Per cent attrition (Over initial wave) - 2.20% 12.09% 18.68% 23.08%
Per cent attrition (Over previous wave) - 2.20% 10.11% 7.5% 5.41%



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table F.2.5: Variables and Their Associated Factor Loadings for Non-cognitive Skills
Variable Factor Loading








Table F.2.6: Summary Statistics of Initial Exclusion Restrictions
Variable Mean
Continuous
Mother’s age at first birth 25.07
(5.76)
Child’s birth weight (pounds) 7.13
(1.30)





Mother not married at time of birth 27.04
Observations 8550
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply
with the requirements of using the restricted-use
dataset. Standard deviations for continuous vari-
ables are reported in parentheses. Standard de-
viations on discrete variables are suppressed for
brevity.
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Table F.2.7: Means and Standard Deviations of State-Level Exogenous Variables
Variable 2011 2012 2013 2014
State Hours of School-Related Leave per Year 7.12 7.79 8.13 8.08
(12.58) (13.21) (13.44) (13.43)
State Average Tax Liability for a Family earning $25,000 -0.19 -0.20 -0.24 -0.28
(0.60) (0.61) (0.64) (0.72)
State Max No. of Weeks of Unemployment Insurance 25.76 25.40 25.16 24.28
(1.37) (1.88) (2.08) (3.36)
State Average Child Tax Credit (000’s) 1.09 1.11 1.11 1.15
(0.54) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
State Average Unemployment Insurance Claim (000’s) 6.55 6.02 5.59 4.41
(1.34) (1.20) (1.17) (1.00)
State Expenditure on Subsidized Child Care (000,000’s) 4.11 4.04 4.17 4.53
(1.21) (1.21) (1.30) (1.42)
State Children per Child Care Center 138.21 160.61 163.89 154.21
(70.61) (81.87) (90.11) (89.02)
State Maximum Weekly Benefit 431.79 438.77 438.44 441.68
(106.01) (111.46) (115.10) (122.57)
State Avg. Child Support (000,000’s) 2.64 2.66 2.71 2.78
(0.88) (0.90) (0.93) (0.94)
State Per Cent Employed in Services 17.45 17.81 18.08 18.11
(1.58) (1.62) (1.65) (1.63)
Observations 8550 8700 7500 5600
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset. Stan-
dard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table F.2.8: Logit: Approximation to the Volunteering Decision
(1) (2)
OLS FIML
Lag Reading Score 0.0306∗∗ (0.0145) 0.0659∗∗∗ (0.0213)
Lag Non-Cognitive Score 0.0620∗∗∗ (0.0193) 0.0668∗∗∗ (0.0198)
Lag Mother Not Employed 0.3195∗∗∗ (0.0407) 0.3190∗∗∗ (0.0407)
Lag Volunteering 2.0273∗∗∗ (0.0368) 2.0279∗∗∗ (0.0416)
Lag Conference 0.3116∗∗∗ (0.0711) 0.3273∗∗∗ (0.0717)
Lag Home Inputs 0.1114∗∗∗ (0.0193) 0.0755∗∗∗ (0.0214)
Lag No. of Siblings −0.0189 (0.0168) −0.0171 (0.0167)
Female 0.0523 (0.0342) 0.0494 (0.0346)
Mother’s Age 0.2333 (0.1532) 0.2272 (0.1654)
Mother’s Age Sq. −0.0136 (0.0205) −0.0129 (0.0222)
Some College 0.2156∗∗∗ (0.0447) 0.2084∗∗∗ (0.0448)
Bachelors or Higher 0.4979∗∗∗ (0.0507) 0.4841∗∗∗ (0.0528)
Household Income 0.4232∗∗∗ (0.0446) 0.4297∗∗∗ (0.0454)
Black −0.1760∗∗∗ (0.0632) −0.1602∗∗ (0.0643)
Hispanic −0.1505∗∗∗ (0.0559) −0.1408∗∗ (0.0567)
Other −0.3504∗∗∗ (0.0617) −0.3393∗∗∗ (0.0619)
Single Parent 0.0784 (0.0508) 0.0765 (0.0508)
Non-English Home Language −0.2683∗∗∗ (0.0573) −0.2679∗∗∗ (0.0584)
Hours of School-Related Leave 0.0058∗∗∗ (0.0015) 0.0060∗∗∗ (0.0016)
Avg. Unemployment Insurance Tax −0.0245 (0.0251) −0.0248 (0.0247)
Children per Child Care Center 0.0007∗∗∗ (0.0002) 0.0007∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Maximum Weekly Benefit −0.0002 (0.0003) −0.0003 (0.0003)
Avg. Child Support (000’s) −0.0042 (0.0226) −0.0026 (0.0228)
Per Cent Employed in Services −0.0030 (0.0110) −0.0034 (0.0116)
Subsidized Child Care Expenditure (000’s) 0.0345∗∗ (0.0160) 0.0370∗∗ (0.0161)
Avg. Child Tax Credit 0.2245∗∗∗ (0.0452) 0.2263∗∗∗ (0.0450)
Average Tax Liability for a Family earning $25,000 0.1202∗∗∗ (0.0318) 0.1207∗∗∗ (0.0317)
Grade 2 −0.2668∗∗∗ (0.0509) −0.3188∗∗∗ (0.0604)
Grade 3 −0.3315∗∗∗ (0.0774) −0.4215∗∗∗ (0.0891)
Constant −2.5550∗∗∗ (0.3726) −2.6263∗∗∗ (0.3986)
Mother/Child Type 1 −0.1488 (0.1113)
Mother/Child Type 2 0.0653 (0.0768)
Mother/Child Type 3 −0.3593∗∗∗ (0.1096)
Time-Varying Type 1 0.2656∗ (0.1421)
Time-Varying Type 2 0.2982∗∗ (0.1321)
Observations 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Missing data indicators are suppressed for brevity.
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Table F.2.9: Logit: Approximation to the Conference Decision
(1) (2)
OLS FIML
Lag Reading Score −0.0902∗∗∗ (0.0265) −0.0936∗∗ (0.0374)
Lag Non-Cognitive Score −0.1261∗∗∗ (0.0357) −0.1196∗∗∗ (0.0361)
Lag Mother Not Employed 0.0794 (0.0704) 0.0790 (0.0713)
Lag Volunteering 0.5563∗∗∗ (0.0670) 0.5495∗∗∗ (0.0682)
Lag Conference 2.0292∗∗∗ (0.0724) 2.0398∗∗∗ (0.0827)
Lag Home Inputs 0.0520 (0.0324) 0.0205 (0.0362)
Lag No. of Siblings 0.0072 (0.0284) 0.0051 (0.0278)
Female −0.1777∗∗∗ (0.0607) −0.1774∗∗∗ (0.0615)
Mother’s Age 0.0318 (0.2644) 0.0305 (0.2389)
Mother’s Age Sq. 0.0064 (0.0352) 0.0070 (0.0314)
Some College 0.1807∗∗ (0.0753) 0.1850∗∗ (0.0741)
Bachelors or Higher 0.5710∗∗∗ (0.0966) 0.5776∗∗∗ (0.1009)
Household Income 0.2244∗∗ (0.0875) 0.2322∗∗∗ (0.0881)
Black 0.3071∗∗∗ (0.1075) 0.3153∗∗∗ (0.1017)
Hispanic −0.0467 (0.0970) −0.0473 (0.0953)
Other 0.2982∗∗ (0.1295) 0.3161∗∗ (0.1350)
Single Parent −0.0721 (0.0834) −0.0756 (0.0818)
Non-English Home Language 0.1220 (0.1037) 0.1211 (0.1005)
Hours of School-Related Leave 0.0187∗∗∗ (0.0035) 0.0187∗∗∗ (0.0034)
Avg. Unemployment Insurance Tax −0.2082∗∗∗ (0.0496) −0.2113∗∗∗ (0.0510)
Children per Child Care Center −0.0007∗ (0.0004) −0.0007∗ (0.0004)
Maximum Weekly Benefit 0.0033∗∗∗ (0.0006) 0.0034∗∗∗ (0.0006)
Avg. Child Support (000’s) −0.2097∗∗∗ (0.0376) −0.2118∗∗∗ (0.0374)
Per Cent Employed in Services 0.1041∗∗∗ (0.0208) 0.1048∗∗∗ (0.0213)
Subsidized Child Care Expenditure (000’s) 0.3132∗∗∗ (0.0391) 0.3139∗∗∗ (0.0385)
Avg. Child Tax Credit 0.3001∗∗∗ (0.0784) 0.3079∗∗∗ (0.0763)
Average Tax Liability for a Family earning $25,000 −0.4433∗∗∗ (0.0813) −0.4471∗∗∗ (0.0873)
Grade 2 −0.2925∗∗∗ (0.0945) −0.2601∗∗ (0.1067)
Grade 3 −0.6129∗∗∗ (0.1452) −0.5755∗∗∗ (0.1623)
Constant −2.3228∗∗∗ (0.6536) −2.3950∗∗∗ (0.6442)
Mother/Child Type 1 0.0085 (0.1921)
Mother/Child Type 2 0.0517 (0.1286)
Mother/Child Type 3 −0.2987 (0.1838)
Time-Varying Type 1 −0.4830∗∗ (0.2341)
Time-Varying Type 2 0.3190 (0.2435)
Observations 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Missing data indicators are suppressed for brevity.
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Table F.2.10: Continuous: Approximation to the Home Input Decisions
(1) (2)
OLS FIML
Lag Reading Score 0.0358∗∗∗ (0.0050) 0.0319∗∗∗ (0.0083)
Lag Non-Cognitive Score 0.0004 (0.0064) 0.0006 (0.0074)
Lag Mother Not Employed 0.0522∗∗∗ (0.0130) 0.0465∗∗∗ (0.0142)
Lag Volunteering 0.0862∗∗∗ (0.0132) 0.0654∗∗∗ (0.0139)
Lag Conference 0.0367 (0.0258) 0.0587∗∗ (0.0263)
Lag Home Inputs 0.3987∗∗∗ (0.0083) 0.2881∗∗∗ (0.0117)
Lag No. of Siblings 0.0012 (0.0056) 0.0010 (0.0062)
Female 0.0370∗∗∗ (0.0114) 0.0424∗∗∗ (0.0125)
Mother’s Age −0.0519 (0.0479) −0.0493 (0.0510)
Mother’s Age Sq. 0.0020 (0.0065) 0.0024 (0.0069)
Some College 0.0718∗∗∗ (0.0164) 0.0763∗∗∗ (0.0177)
Bachelors or Higher 0.1556∗∗∗ (0.0180) 0.1667∗∗∗ (0.0199)
Household Income 0.0388∗∗∗ (0.0140) 0.0477∗∗∗ (0.0147)
Black −0.1790∗∗∗ (0.0246) −0.1726∗∗∗ (0.0267)
Hispanic −0.1459∗∗∗ (0.0205) −0.1525∗∗∗ (0.0221)
Other 0.0021 (0.0229) 0.0223 (0.0228)
Single Parent 0.0697∗∗∗ (0.0187) 0.0706∗∗∗ (0.0196)
Non-English Home Language 0.0489∗∗ (0.0220) 0.0565∗∗ (0.0225)
Hours of School-Related Leave 0.0019∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.0018∗∗∗ (0.0005)
Avg. Unemployment Insurance Tax −0.0359∗∗∗ (0.0084) −0.0362∗∗∗ (0.0085)
Children per Child Care Center 0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.0002∗∗ (0.0001)
Maximum Weekly Benefit 0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Avg. Child Support (000’s) −0.0192∗∗ (0.0075) −0.0159∗∗ (0.0080)
Per Cent Employed in Services 0.0127∗∗∗ (0.0037) 0.0135∗∗∗ (0.0040)
Subsidized Child Care Expenditure (000’s) 0.0075 (0.0053) 0.0100∗ (0.0055)
Avg. Child Tax Credit 0.0121 (0.0152) 0.0141 (0.0160)
Average Tax Liability for a Family earning $25,000 −0.0136 (0.0098) −0.0123 (0.0104)
Grade 2 −0.1364∗∗∗ (0.0174) −0.1305∗∗∗ (0.0208)
Grade 3 −0.2398∗∗∗ (0.0256) −0.2354∗∗∗ (0.0312)
Constant −0.4932∗∗∗ (0.1210) −0.5510∗∗∗ (0.1319)
Mother/Child Type 1 0.0701 (0.0460)
Mother/Child Type 2 0.1041∗∗∗ (0.0332)
Mother/Child Type 3 −1.0747∗∗∗ (0.0582)
Time-Varying Type 1 0.0380 (0.0567)
Time-Varying Type 2 −0.0312 (0.0589)
Observations 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Missing data indicators are suppressed for brevity.
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Table F.2.11: Logit: Approximation to the Maternal Non-Employment Decision
(1) (2)
OLS FIML
Lag Reading Score −0.0153 (0.0169) −0.0155 (0.0251)
Lag Non-Cognitive Score −0.0174 (0.0234) −0.0182 (0.0238)
Lag Mother Not Employed 3.3031∗∗∗ (0.0444) 3.3041∗∗∗ (0.0488)
Lag Volunteering 0.2073∗∗∗ (0.0512) 0.2036∗∗∗ (0.0514)
Lag Conference −0.2311∗∗∗ (0.0887) −0.2241∗∗ (0.0890)
Lag Home Inputs 0.0243 (0.0242) −0.0035 (0.0272)
Lag No. of Siblings 0.1520∗∗∗ (0.0204) 0.1519∗∗∗ (0.0207)
Female 0.0284 (0.0407) 0.0317 (0.0409)
Mother’s Age −0.6284∗∗∗ (0.1789) −0.6309∗∗∗ (0.1788)
Mother’s Age Sq. 0.0883∗∗∗ (0.0238) 0.0888∗∗∗ (0.0240)
Some College −0.2422∗∗∗ (0.0555) −0.2416∗∗∗ (0.0541)
Bachelors or Higher −0.5095∗∗∗ (0.0623) −0.5085∗∗∗ (0.0634)
Household Income 0.0370 (0.0515) 0.0385 (0.0520)
Black −0.1964∗∗ (0.0818) −0.1944∗∗ (0.0791)
Hispanic −0.0144 (0.0677) −0.0173 (0.0671)
Other −0.0667 (0.0723) −0.0650 (0.0741)
Single Parent 0.5574∗∗∗ (0.0649) 0.5575∗∗∗ (0.0636)
Non-English Home Language 0.1896∗∗∗ (0.0687) 0.1925∗∗∗ (0.0672)
Hours of School-Related Leave −0.0005 (0.0018) −0.0005 (0.0018)
Avg. Unemployment Insurance Tax 0.0684∗∗ (0.0297) 0.0690∗∗ (0.0296)
Children per Child Care Center 0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0002) 0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Maximum Weekly Benefit −0.0007∗∗ (0.0003) −0.0007∗∗ (0.0003)
Avg. Child Support (000’s) 0.0092 (0.0277) 0.0097 (0.0275)
Per Cent Employed in Services −0.0290∗∗ (0.0143) −0.0291∗∗ (0.0130)
Subsidized Child Care Expenditure (000’s) 0.0340∗ (0.0196) 0.0341∗ (0.0195)
Avg. Child Tax Credit −0.5996∗∗∗ (0.0533) −0.5989∗∗∗ (0.0534)
Average Tax Liability for a Family earning $25,000 0.2102∗∗∗ (0.0389) 0.2101∗∗∗ (0.0393)
Grade 2 −0.1550∗∗∗ (0.0588) −0.1510∗∗ (0.0690)
Grade 3 −0.0761 (0.0925) −0.0722 (0.1064)
Constant −0.7898∗ (0.4558) −0.7972∗ (0.4450)
Mother/Child Type 1 0.0427 (0.1316)
Mother/Child Type 2 0.0022 (0.0927)
Mother/Child Type 3 −0.3074∗∗ (0.1434)
Time-Varying Type 1 0.0880 (0.1525)
Time-Varying Type 2 0.0526 (0.1269)
Observations 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Missing data indicators are suppressed for brevity.
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Table F.2.12: Logit: Approximation to the Decrease Siblings Decision
(1) (2)
OLS FIML
Lag Reading Score −0.0512 (0.0454) −0.0682 (0.0726)
Lag Non-Cognitive Score −0.1506∗∗∗ (0.0549) −0.1524∗∗∗ (0.0585)
Lag Mother Not Employed −0.1605 (0.1117) −0.1648 (0.1171)
Lag Volunteering −0.2280∗∗ (0.1130) −0.2106∗ (0.1180)
Lag Conference −0.2980∗ (0.1776) −0.3021∗ (0.1809)
Lag Home Inputs −0.0876∗ (0.0527) −0.0505 (0.0667)
Lag No. of Siblings 0.5747∗∗∗ (0.0339) 0.5764∗∗∗ (0.0401)
Female 0.2859∗∗∗ (0.1029) 0.2971∗∗∗ (0.1105)
Mother’s Age 3.7350∗∗∗ (0.8755) 3.6918∗∗∗ (0.9055)
Mother’s Age Sq. −0.3101∗∗∗ (0.0994) −0.3049∗∗∗ (0.1034)
Some College 0.0292 (0.1395) 0.0402 (0.1446)
Bachelors or Higher −0.7231∗∗∗ (0.1692) −0.7086∗∗∗ (0.1783)
Household Income −0.1764 (0.1313) −0.1819 (0.1345)
Black 0.1527 (0.1778) 0.1499 (0.1836)
Hispanic −0.2549 (0.1720) −0.2646 (0.1854)
Other −0.3677 (0.2269) −0.3876∗ (0.2337)
Single Parent −0.2487 (0.1518) −0.2499∗ (0.1507)
Non-English Home Language −0.6257∗∗∗ (0.1980) −0.6138∗∗∗ (0.2148)
Hours of School-Related Leave 0.0022 (0.0050) 0.0022 (0.0053)
Avg. Unemployment Insurance Tax 0.0320 (0.0709) 0.0333 (0.0716)
Children per Child Care Center 0.0009∗ (0.0006) 0.0009 (0.0006)
Maximum Weekly Benefit −0.0004 (0.0008) −0.0004 (0.0008)
Avg. Child Support (000’s) 0.1328∗ (0.0729) 0.1349∗ (0.0769)
Per Cent Employed in Services 0.0472 (0.0313) 0.0484 (0.0344)
Subsidized Child Care Expenditure (000’s) 0.0124 (0.0539) 0.0116 (0.0549)
Avg. Child Tax Credit −0.3264∗∗ (0.1329) −0.3206∗∗ (0.1372)
Average Tax Liability for a Family earning $25,000 0.1607∗ (0.0958) 0.1562 (0.0982)
Grade 2 0.3504∗∗ (0.1492) 0.4042∗∗ (0.1761)
Grade 3 0.1962 (0.2371) 0.2711 (0.2811)
Constant −14.8067∗∗∗ (1.9327) −14.7733∗∗∗ (2.0170)
Mother/Child Type 1 0.1445 (0.3799)
Mother/Child Type 2 −0.1009 (0.2637)
Mother/Child Type 3 0.2862 (0.3507)
Time-Varying Type 1 −1.3292 (2.8987)
Time-Varying Type 2 0.2483 (0.2751)
Observations 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Missing data indicators are suppressed for brevity.
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Table F.2.13: Logit: Approximation to the Increase Siblings Decision
(1) (2)
OLS FIML
Lag Reading Score −0.0115 (0.0298) −0.0533 (0.0448)
Lag Non-Cognitive Score −0.0707∗ (0.0365) −0.0775∗∗ (0.0376)
Lag Mother Not Employed 0.1080 (0.0710) 0.1069 (0.0702)
Lag Volunteering 0.0506 (0.0719) 0.0525 (0.0718)
Lag Conference −0.1337 (0.1144) −0.1373 (0.1169)
Lag Home Inputs 0.0178 (0.0350) 0.0203 (0.0396)
Lag No. of Siblings −0.2044∗∗∗ (0.0459) −0.2058∗∗∗ (0.0455)
Female −0.0049 (0.0670) 0.0028 (0.0675)
Mother’s Age 0.1019 (0.2299) 0.0940 (0.2586)
Mother’s Age Sq. −0.1117∗∗∗ (0.0383) −0.1101∗∗∗ (0.0418)
Some College −0.1565∗ (0.0840) −0.1457∗ (0.0843)
Bachelors or Higher −0.2727∗∗∗ (0.1027) −0.2485∗∗ (0.1054)
Household Income −0.2214∗∗ (0.0975) −0.2234∗∗ (0.0974)
Black 0.2696∗∗ (0.1269) 0.2538∗∗ (0.1252)
Hispanic 0.1092 (0.1139) 0.0961 (0.1131)
Other −0.0767 (0.1348) −0.0822 (0.1321)
Single Parent 0.5714∗∗∗ (0.1093) 0.5783∗∗∗ (0.1090)
Non-English Home Language 0.1456 (0.1189) 0.1460 (0.1175)
Hours of School-Related Leave −0.0031 (0.0031) −0.0033 (0.0030)
Avg. Unemployment Insurance Tax 0.0124 (0.0467) 0.0128 (0.0466)
Children per Child Care Center 0.0015∗∗∗ (0.0004) 0.0015∗∗∗ (0.0004)
Maximum Weekly Benefit 0.0000 (0.0005) 0.0000 (0.0005)
Avg. Child Support (000’s) −0.0096 (0.0450) −0.0123 (0.0447)
Per Cent Employed in Services −0.0094 (0.0213) −0.0100 (0.0210)
Subsidized Child Care Expenditure (000’s) 0.0118 (0.0311) 0.0105 (0.0307)
Avg. Child Tax Credit −0.0230 (0.0885) −0.0265 (0.0892)
Average Tax Liability for a Family earning $25,000 0.0819 (0.0624) 0.0825 (0.0627)
Grade 2 −0.0177 (0.0983) 0.0559 (0.1171)
Grade 3 −0.0910 (0.1511) 0.0275 (0.1818)
Constant −1.7094∗∗∗ (0.6323)
Mother/Child Type 1 0.2236 (0.2119)
Mother/Child Type 2 0.0525 (0.1410)
Mother/Child Type 3 0.1163 (0.2093)
Time-Varying Type 1 0.3400 (0.3785)
Time-Varying Type 2 −0.2030 (0.1908)
Observations 21750 21750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Missing data indicators are suppressed for brevity.
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Table F.2.14: Logit: Attrition
(1) (2)
OLS FIML
Reading Score −0.0133∗∗∗ (0.0017) −0.0905 (0.0178)
Non-Cognitive Score −0.0114∗∗∗ (0.0027) −0.0631 (0.0207)
Mother Not Employed 0.0195∗∗∗ (0.0054) 0.1291 (0.0388)
Volunteering −0.0154∗∗∗ (0.0054) −0.0992∗∗ (0.0395)
Conference −0.0118 (0.0099) −0.0761∗∗∗ (0.0652)
Home Inputs 0.0097∗∗∗ (0.0027) 0.0716∗∗∗ (0.0264)
Decrease Siblings 0.0143 (0.0179) 0.1180∗∗∗ (0.1284)
Increase Siblings 0.0163 (0.0117) 0.1130∗∗∗ (0.0775)
Female 0.0099∗∗ (0.0048) 0.0732∗∗∗ (0.0364)
Mother’s Age −0.0591∗∗ (0.0245) −0.2565∗∗∗ (0.1782)
Mother’s Age Sq. 0.0031 (0.0033) −0.0012∗∗∗ (0.0253)
Some College 0.0145∗∗ (0.0068) 0.0975∗∗∗ (0.0480)
Bachelors or Higher 0.0251∗∗∗ (0.0074) 0.1607∗∗∗ (0.0569)
Household Income −0.0030 (0.0061) −0.0126∗∗∗ (0.0453)
Black 0.0533∗∗∗ (0.0102) 0.3305∗∗∗ (0.0616)
Hispanic −0.0001 (0.0085) 0.0063∗∗∗ (0.0620)
Other 0.0393∗∗∗ (0.0093) 0.2712∗∗∗ (0.0641)
Single Parent −0.0314∗∗∗ (0.0080) −0.2020∗∗∗ (0.0517)
Non-English Home Language −0.0235∗∗∗ (0.0090) −0.1513∗∗∗ (0.0637)
Hours of School-Related Leave −0.0006∗∗∗ (0.0002) −0.0050∗∗∗ (0.0017)
Avg. Unemployment Insurance Tax 0.0215∗∗∗ (0.0031) 0.1488∗∗∗ (0.0212)
Children per Child Care Center 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Maximum Weekly Benefit −0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000 −0.0007∗∗∗ (0.0003)
Avg. Child Support (000’s) 0.0139∗∗∗ (0.0033) 0.0938∗∗∗ (0.0238)
Per Cent Employed in Services −0.0050∗∗∗ (0.0016) −0.0358∗∗∗ (0.0126)
Subsidized Child Care Expenditure (000’s) 0.0018 (0.0023) 0.0112∗∗∗ (0.0182)
Avg. Child Tax Credit −0.0355∗∗∗ (0.0063) −0.2436∗∗∗ (0.0446)
Average Tax Liability for a Family earning $25,000 0.0307∗∗∗ (0.0042) 0.2466∗∗∗ (0.0363)
Grade 2 0.0484∗∗∗ (0.0063) 0.3355∗∗∗ (0.0536)
Constant 1.3950∗∗∗ (0.0588) −0.0268∗∗∗ (0.4327)
Mother/Child Type 1 −0.2026∗∗∗ (0.1232)
Mother/Child Type 2 −0.3795∗∗∗ (0.0931)
Mother/Child Type 3 −0.3575∗∗∗ (0.1557)
Time-Varying Type 1 0.3953∗∗∗ (0.1684)
Time-Varying Type 2 −0.4449∗∗∗ (0.1386)
Observations 24750 24750
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-use dataset.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Missing data indicators are suppressed for brevity.
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Table F.2.15: Continuous: Initial Reading Skills
(1) (2)
OLS FIML
Female 0.1650∗∗∗ (0.0239) 0.1127∗∗∗ (0.0255)
Black −0.0208 (0.0431) −0.0733 (0.0472)
Hispanic −0.2117∗∗∗ (0.0328) −0.2216∗∗∗ (0.0357)
Other 0.2565∗∗∗ (0.0414) 0.1615∗∗∗ (0.0435)
Mother Not Married at Birth −0.2128∗∗∗ (0.0312) −0.1658∗∗∗ (0.0312)
Mother’s Age at First Birth 0.0457∗∗∗ (0.0174) 0.0267 (0.0172)
Mother’s Age at First Birth Squared −0.0056∗ (0.0033) −0.0031 (0.0032)
Birth Weight 0.0561∗∗∗ (0.0092) 0.0298∗∗∗ (0.0087)
No. of older siblings −0.0886∗∗∗ (0.0130) −0.0860∗∗∗ (0.0159)
Birth Order −0.0150 (0.0175) −0.0283 (0.0181)
Some College 0.2832∗∗∗ (0.0310) 0.2577∗∗∗ (0.0334)
Bachelors or Higher 0.6347∗∗∗ (0.0357) 0.5422∗∗∗ (0.0404)
Constant −0.1908 (0.2338) −0.7284∗∗∗ (0.2276)
Mother/Child Type 1 2.7617∗∗∗ (0.0745)
Mother/Child Type 2 1.0359∗∗∗ (0.0276)
Mother/Child Type 3 0.9598∗∗∗ (0.1085)
Observations 8550 8550
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-
use dataset. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Missing data indicators are suppressed
for brevity.
Table F.2.16: Continuous: Initial Math Skills
(1) (2)
OLS FIML
Female −0.0329 (0.0210) −0.0933∗∗∗ (0.0234)
Black −0.3235∗∗∗ (0.0377) −0.3563∗∗∗ (0.0434)
Hispanic −0.3001∗∗∗ (0.0297) −0.2979∗∗∗ (0.0324)
Other 0.0732∗∗ (0.0334) 0.0124 (0.0368)
Mother Not Married at Birth −0.1576∗∗∗ (0.0285) −0.1116∗∗∗ (0.0286)
Mother’s Age at First Birth 0.0404∗∗ (0.0157) 0.0210 (0.0160)
Mother’s Age at First Birth Squared −0.0044 (0.0029) −0.0017 (0.0030)
Birth Weight 0.0678∗∗∗ (0.0083) 0.0421∗∗∗ (0.0080)
No. of older siblings −0.0088 (0.0119) −0.0056 (0.0146)
Birth Order −0.0124 (0.0156) −0.0219 (0.0169)
Some College 0.2504∗∗∗ (0.0288) 0.2240∗∗∗ (0.0313)
Bachelors or Higher 0.6169∗∗∗ (0.0318) 0.5450∗∗∗ (0.0356)
Constant 0.0221 (0.2187) −0.5979∗∗∗ (0.2130)
Mother/Child Type 1 2.3719∗∗∗ (0.0380)
Mother/Child Type 2 1.2554∗∗∗ (0.0276)
Mother/Child Type 3 1.1858∗∗∗ (0.1246)
Observations 8550 8550
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-
use dataset. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Missing data indicators are suppressed
for brevity.
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Table F.2.17: Continuous: Initial Non-Cognitive Skills
(1) (2)
OLS FIML
Female 0.4629∗∗∗ (0.0198) 0.4278∗∗∗ (0.02040)
Black −0.1443∗∗∗ (0.0383) −0.1565∗∗∗ (0.03950)
Hispanic 0.0104 (0.0283) 0.0154 (0.02900)
Other 0.0653∗∗ (0.0303) 0.0434 (0.03050)
Mother Not Married at Birth −0.1958∗∗∗ (0.0284) −0.1712∗∗∗ (0.02820)
Mother’s Age at First Birth 0.0800∗∗∗ (0.0150) 0.0695∗∗∗ (0.01480)
Mother’s Age at First Birth Squared −0.0135∗∗∗ (0.0028) −0.0120∗∗∗ (0.00270)
Birth Weight 0.0379∗∗∗ (0.0078) 0.0245∗∗∗ (0.00760)
No. of older siblings 0.0354∗∗∗ (0.0110) 0.0374∗∗∗ (0.01160)
Birth Order 0.0681∗∗∗ (0.0146) 0.0647∗∗∗ (0.01480)
Some College 0.0009 (0.0279) −0.0133 (0.02810)
Bachelors or Higher 0.1535∗∗∗ (0.0296) 0.1225∗∗∗ (0.03020)
Constant −2.1321∗∗∗ (0.2080) −2.5011∗∗∗ (0.20340)
Mother/Child Type 1 1.1453∗∗∗ (0.05190)
Mother/Child Type 2 0.7496∗∗∗ (0.04190)
Mother/Child Type 3 0.7706∗∗∗ (0.09730)
Observations 8550 8550
Notes: Observations have been rounded to comply with the requirements of using the restricted-
use dataset. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Missing data indicators are suppressed
for brevity.
G.2.1 Figures
Figure G.2.1: Parents’ Report on How Well the School Makes Them Aware of Opportunities to
Volunteer
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Figure G.2.2: Schools’ Report on the Frequency of Parent-Teacher Conferences
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